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ABSTRACT

The Hudson Highlands were the single most important
piece of terrain in North America during the War of American
Independence.
It was vital that this point be defended to
prevent New England from being severed from the rest of the
colonies.
During 1775 and 1776 the Continental Congress and the
New York Provincial Congress erected a series of fortifica
tions in the Highlands.
By a system of trial and error the
Americans established the precedent that the Highlands were
to constitute a distinct force operating independently from
the field armies and directly responsible to General George
Washington.
.In 1777 the British planners failed to appreciate the
value of the Highlands.
General Israel Putnam, the commander
of the Highlands during the campaign of 1777, ineptly
handled his forces and was completely outnaneuvored by
General Henry Clinton who captured the Highlands on 6
October 1777*
He had too few men to retain them, and was
unable to move soon enough to rescue Burgoyne.
The British failure to retain control of the Highlands
represents one of the three *turning points* of the war.
Although the Battle of Saratoga was decisive diplomatically,
and the experience at Valley Forge matured the tactical
organization of the American army, it was with this
temporary loss of the Highlands that Washington came of age
strategically.
To prevent a repetition he constructed
Fortress West Point and never let the field army leave
supporting distance of the Highlands.
This strategy
stalemated the British in the northern colonies.

v

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE:
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1 777 IN THE HTTDSON HIGHLANDS

CHAPTER I
GEOGRAPHY OP THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS
The Hudson River flows from north to south, originating
near Lake George, and emptying into the sea at New York
City,

For the majority of Its length it passes through low,

rolling country.

Sixty-two miles above Mew York City

there is an abrupt change In the nature of the terrain and
the course of the river.

At this point,

the river

enters a twelve-mile wide strip of mountainous country
known as the Hudson Highlands.
The Hudson Highlands are a spur of the Appalachian
Mountain chain that properly begins near the PennsylvaniaNew Jersey border and runs north-west to the Vermont-New
Hampshire border.

Technically the Highlands here will be

considered as the area immediately bordering the Hudson
River.

The principle peaks on the west side from north
i
to south are Storm King Mountain,
Bear Mountain, and the

Dund.erburg.

On the east bank the hills are not as

sharply defined.

Breakneck Ridge, Anthony1s Nose, and

the Peekskill hills correspond respectively to the three
1.

For convenience sake, and because contemporary
spellings were never uniform, modern spellings have
been used throughout this paper.
See Map 1.

2

3

Map 1
The Hudson Highlands*

’■* Based on Robert
State of New York
By Robert Erskine
in the possession

Erskine, A Map of the Highlands in the
Done for his Excellence Genl Washington
F*B.S. Geog. To ihe Army July 1?79»
of the History Society of Pennsylvania.

Fishkill
Newburgh Ferry
Newburgh
New Windsor
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Polopel Island
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?
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Anthony*s Nose
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Crompond
Peekskill
Peekskill Bay
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chief western peaks*

These heights rise to over one

thousand feet above the level of the river, and the
banks are frequently one hundred feet high.
The Hudson River follows an essentially southern
course throughout most of its length.

In the Highlands,

the harder granite and complex gneiss rock formations
eroded more unevenly.

This has resulted in abrupt

changes in the direction of the river.

The high shores

also senve to funnel the winds, which hinders the progre
of sailing vessels.

To compound this difficulty,

the

river is also tidal for a distance above the Highlands.
The principle bends occur at points where the river also
narrows sharply.

The southern pair of right-angle bends

is located at the twelve hundred foot high Anthony *s
Nose at the site of Bear Mountain State Park.

The river

here narrows to approximately sixteen hundred, feet and
this tunneling effect has carved a channel ninety feet
d.eep*

Six miles further north at West Point there is

another pair of right-angle bends around the point and
Constitution Island (or Martelaer's Rock).

The river

here is three hundred feet narrower than at Bear Mountax
but just as deep, which results in the tidal surges
being less abrupt.
Both above and below the Highlands the river is
considerably wider.

But the result of this widening

coupled with the less severe banks has resulted in
noticeable differences in the river.

The channel in

5
these areas is narrower, with extensive shoals.

Furthermore,

the course of the river is relatively direct, without
abrupt changes in direction.
In 177.5 the Highlands were rough country.

The harsh

nature of the terrain is particularly evident today to a
motorist driving along either the Palisades Interstate
Parkway or New York Route Nine West.

On 10 June 1778

Surgeon James Thacher reported on the view from Storm King
Mountain•
Looking down as from a cloud, we beheld the Hudson,
resembling a vast canal cut through mountains of
stupendous magnitude, a few boats playing on its
surface were scarcely visible.
But to the pen of
the post and the pencil of the painter, be con
signed the task of describing the wonders of
nature there exhibited, in the form o f 'huge
mountains, reeky cliffs, and venerable forests,
in one confused mass.1
"
This area, and especially the west bank, was sparsely
1
settled in 1775 3rd still largely virgin forest.
The west bank of the Higlands was contained in Ulster
Coimty.

Its centers of population were Newburgh,

above Storm King Mountain, and New Windsor,
further north.

just

several miles

New Windsor had a population of almost

one thousand and was a river town of fifty buildings.
Newburgh was also a river town situated on Plum Point,
across from Polopel Island, and of a lesser size.
2.

3.
5.

James Thacher, A Midita^y Journal During the American
Revolutiorarv War (2nd e d . ; Poston:
Cottons & Bernard,
1.827), p. 1?2. ■
A* Elwood Corning, Wes M u t t o n at Temple Hill (Newburgh,
N.Y.:
Lanmere Publishing Company, 1932*5 , "D*
Ibid.. p. 5.
Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Because the river was navigable to ships which could cross
the bar at New York harbor,

the towns of the Highlands

were situated to provide access to the river. ^Land
transportation was rudimentary, and the roads poor.

Even

the Clove, as the Upper Ramapo Valley was called, which
provided the principle road to New Jersey and the south, was
primitive, although passable for wagons.
Dutchess County encompassed the eastern portion of the
Highlands.

Because it was more populous, and. because it

was contiguous to the settled areas of New York and
Connecticut, Dutchess had a more extensive road network.
Fishkill was its largest town with fifty buildings astride
the road to New England. 6

Peekskill, a hamlet of twenty

houses in 1775, possessed docks which made it the center
of the river trade and a main stop in the Albany Post Road.

7

The bulk of the county was owned by Pierre Van Courtlandt,
8
who had sided with the patriots in 177^K"
The other major
landowner was Beverly Robinson, who resided opposite West
Point and subsequently became an ardent loyalist.
The area north of the Highlands was included in Albany
County.
counties.
6.

7.
8.

Between the Highlands and New York harbor were two
On the east bank was Westchester County,

Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America in the
Year s 179 0 , 1781 and 1 ?8 2 9 tran s . e d . (Lond.o n :G .G „J .
and J. Robinson, 1787; Reprint e d . ; New York:
Arno
Press, 1968), vol. 1, p. 6 8 .
Emma L. Patterson, Peekskill in the American Revolution.
(Peekskill, N.Y. : Friendly Town Association, 1 9 ^ ) ,
p. 1 •
Ibid., p. 6 .

stretching south-east to Long Island Sound*

On the west

bank Orange County, with its largest town of Tappan,
stretched to the New Jersey border.
Communications between New England and the other
colonies passed through New York City,

but there were

subsidiary routes through the Highlands and lower reaches
of the Hudson.

Below the Highlands, Dobbs Ferry crossed

at the southern edge of the Tappan Zee.
proper Kings Ferry, a clumsy,

In the Highlands

square-ended flatboat

propelled by sweeps, crossed between Verplanck *s Point on
o
the east and Stony Point on the west.' Above the
Highlands there were several crossing points including New
Windsor and Albany.
Strategically, the importance of the Hudson River Valle
had been recognized in the Colonial Wars.

The navigability

of the river for warships as far as Albany provided a means
for the Royal Navy to penetrate effectively far inland.

At

the same time the Richelieu River-Lake Champlain-Lake
George route gave water access from Canada.

There were only

three places where this penetration could be easily blocked.
One was New York City; another was Fort Txcorderoga.

The

third, of no importance in the colonial wars because the
emphasis was directed against Canada, was the Highlands.
During the War of American Independence when the Royal
Navy was hostile,

the Highlands emerged preeminent.

The

Highlands provided the one solid defensive position where
9»

Ibid., p. 6

an inferior American army could block the Royal Navy and
the British Army,

Not only was the terrain suited for

tactical defense by an alert commander, but he^vy artillery
emplaced at the proper positions could take advantage of
the bends, tides, and winds to deny the passage of the
river to shipping.

In addition to the difficulty in

tactical operations, the great extent of the mountain
chain prevented even strategic outflanking.

10.

10

The best examination of this subject is in Gerald C.
Stowe and Jac Weller, "Revolutionary West Point:
’The Key to the Continent,1" Military Affairs. XX
(Summer., 1956), pp. 81-98.

CHAPTER II
17 75
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities,

the Second

Continental Congress realized the strategic importance of
the Highlands.

They resolved on 25 Hay 1775 to have for

tifications erected on the north end of Manhattan Island
at Kings Bridge, and in the Highlands to bar navigation
of the r i v e r T h e

New York Provincial Congress, author

ized by the Continental Congress to undertake this
fortification, formed a committee to inspect the area on
30 May.

Colonel James Clinton and Christopher Tappan,

both delegates from Ulster County, were selected as the
2
members of the committee..
Their report, with an
Illustrative map, was submitted on 10 June, and they were
instructed to prepare a cover letter to the New York
delegates to the Continental Congress to accompany a 'copy
a
of the report.
1.

2.

3.

Continenta1 Congress, Journals of the Continental
Congress 1774-1 789, ed. by Worthington C. Ford (?A
vols.; Washington:
Government Printing Office:
1904-3?), II, pp. 59-60,
Peter Force, e d . , American Arch1ve s : A Collection of
Authentio Records, State Parers. Pebates , and Letters
and other Not:* res of Public Affairs . ~T9 vols. ;
Washington:
M, St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 18391853),"Series 4, II, p. 1266.
Ibid.. Ser. 4, II, p. 1291.
9

10
This report was sent on 13 June,

In it, James Clinton

and Tappan stated that they had completed their survey in
the company of Captain Samuel Bayard and Captain Erasmus
Williams,

In their opinion, a force of three hundred men

at Constitution Island and two hundred at Popolopen Creek,
opposite Anthony1s Nose, would be sufficient.

The works

constructed at these points could make the cost of forcing
a passage prohibitive.

They suggested that stone and lime

be used as the construction materials because their
relative availability made them cheaper.

The?/- also recom

mended that a boorn be installed to block the passage at
short notice,

several small boats be procured for communi

cations, and a. large magazine be built at Constitution
Island.

The estimated cost of all these measures was £ 1>00.

On 18 August the New York Congress resolved to build
the fortifications according to the recommendations of this
report.

Five Commissioners were elected to supervise the

work, with the provision that any three would form a quorum.
Isaac Sears, John Berrien, Christopher Miller, Anthony
Rutgers, and Colonel Edward Fleming were elected as
Commissioners.

Four days later Captain Bayard and Captain

William Bedlow were elected to replace Fleming and Rutgers
who could not participate for personal reasons.

At this

time, authorization was also give for the procurement of
cannon and stores for the Highlands and for the organization

5*

1295-6.
Ibid., Ser. b, III, p. 535.

11
of the militia of the state.

6

A sixth Commissioner,

Thomas Grenell, was selected on 6 September and an initial
£250 was advanced to Captain Bedlow.

7

The first of many controversies erupted on 13
September when the New York Congress requested Brigadier
General David Wooster to send one company of his Continental
troops to the Highlands to assist in the construction of
the fortifications and to garrison them.

They cited as

their authority instructions from the Continental Congress
o
to do this.
In a letter on 15 September Wooster politely
refused to comply.

He reasoned that since he had received

orders from Lieutenant General George Washington to avoid
dispersing his forces, he could not send the requested
company until he received orders to that effect from
q
Washington or the Continental Congress *
After another
exchange of letters,

the New York Congress gave up and
10
referred the matter to Philadelphia.
In the meantime, work had begun on the first set of
works on Constitution Island.
Romans,

On 1^1- September Bernard

the engineer appointed to supervise construction,

submitted his plans and maos for the minimum defences
necessary for Constitution Island to the New York Congress.
He called for five blockhouses, a battery, a magazine,
6.
?•
8.
9.
10.

Ibid.. Ser.
Ibid'. . Ser.
Ibid. . Ser.
Ibid.,
Ser.
Ibid— , Ser.

4,
4,
4,
4,

III,
III,
III,
III,
III,

pp. 541-2.
p. 880.
p. 893 .
pu. 397-8.
pp. 732-5.

12
storehouses, a guardroom, a barracks, and stonework.

His

estimate of the expense of erecting these buildings,
11
including labor, was *46^5, ^s, 4d.
On 19 September
the New York Congress forwarded them to the Continental
Congress.

In their covering letter they stated that

incidental expenses would probably amount to an additional

£1500.12
Also on 19 September the New York Committee of Safety,
the organization of the Mew York Congress which met during
periods of adjournment,
Constitution Island.

took steps to secure title to

A letter was -drafted to Beverly

Robinson stating that Continental Congress had authorized
the construction of a fort on the east bank of the Hudson
opposite West Point.
As the Provincial Congress by no means intend to
invade private property, this Committee, in their
recess, have thought proper to request you put a
reasonable price upon the whole point of dry land
or Island, called N a r te1 a e r 1s R ock Island, which
price, if they approve of it, they are ready to pay
you for it.15
Robinson*s reply of 2 October stated that while he would
have been happy to let them use the island since there
Ak,
was little arable land, he did not own it.
He mentioned
that the property was owned by a Mrs. Ogilvie and her
children.

Apparently the matter was not pursued further

since no subsequent mention was made of it.
11.
12.
13*
1'i.

Jbid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid. .
Ibid.,

Ser. *!■, Ill, pp. 735-6.
Ser. 'l, III, pp. 732-3.
Ser.
III, p. 902.
Ser.
III, p. 127**.

13
A second quarrel erupted when Commissioners Hanson,
Bedlow, and Bayard wrote the Committee of Safety on 25
September.

This letter includes the first reference to the

new fort as Port Constitution, from which the island has
derived its current name.

In their letter, the Commissioners

complained that the Committee of Safety should have con
sulted them before writing the Continental Congress on
19 September.

In their opinion, Romans' plans were not only

insufficient for more than a temporary delay, but the
position would require an unwarranted expense to be made
defensible.

They further requested that .the Committee of

Safety establish whether they were in charge of Romans, or
he was in charge of them.

As a footnote they mentioned

that while the first cannon were to be emplaced that week,
the Royal Governor, William Tryon, and several associates
had been at Haverstraw on 23 September and had questioned
15
Captain Palmer about the state of the works. ^
Romans appeared before the Committee of Safety on
29 September and offered to contract to build the fort
under his sole management for £ 5000, exclusive of cannon.
He stipulated that the Commissioners would only supervise
his execution of the works.
again questioned him.

16

The next day the Committee

They then informed him that they

would not contract for the works but would employ him
as engineer at the temporary pay of a Continental Colonel.
15.
16.

Ibid., Ser.
III, pp. 91^-5.
Ibid,3 Ser. iv, III, pp. 916-7.

14
This was neither the twenty shillings a day which he
claimed was the pay of a British engineer nor the twelve
shillings which was actually the c a s e . ^

T-foe .Commissioners

were also instructed to assist Romans as engineer on that
18
day•

Apparently on the basis of this pay rate Romans

began referring to himself as colonel.
The 19 September communication to the Continental
Congress was debated from 5 to 7 October in Philadelphia.
John Adams recorded tViat on 5 October a favorable response
to Romans* plan was voiced by several delegates on the
grounds that fortification should either be effectively
prosecuted or dropped entirely.

1Q
'

On 6 October John

Morton, Silas Deane, and Robert Livingston were elected
as a committee to examine the letter and deliver a report
on it the next day.

20

This report was delivered on schedule, and after
being debated, a letter to the New York Congress
authorized.

New York was directed

torender

was

the river

immediately defensible, with first emphasis to be given
to those portions which could be finished before winter
set in.

Wood or fascines were suggested as building

materials for this reason.
17.
18.
19*

20.

But the New York Congress

J b i d . , Ser. 4, TIT, p. 919.
I b id. , Ser. 4, III, pp. 919-20.
John A d a ms, The Ad ams Parers: Piany and A^tobiorraphy
of John Adams, T.X; mho Diary of
Adams 1 7 71 781,
ed, L. H. Butterfield, (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard
University Press, 1961), p. 197.
National Archives, Parers of the Continental Congress
1774-1?8o„ Tran script Journals, reel 15.

15
was given a free hand ”since it is the opinion of the
CCont inentalj Congress, that the work should by no means
be neglected.”

The suggestion was also made that Viest

Point and Popolopen Creek be investigated as sites for
small, harassing batteries of heavy cannon.

It was

recommended that an intelligence and warning system be
established, that some means of obstructing the river be
built, and that New Jersey and Connecticut be consulted
for assistance.

Brigadier General Wooster was also

instructed to provide the requested troops unless he had
received orders to the contrary from Major General Philip
21
Schuyler, then commanding the Northern Department. 'J* Adams
reported that James Duane was responsible for the instruc
tions concerning Wooster and John Rutledge for the proposal
22
to construct a boom.
Yet another controversy erupted at Port Constitution
on 15 October.

Commissioners Bayard and Bedlow had started

requiring vessels passing the works to sho\^ their politics
by dipping their sails in salute to the flag.

On 15 October

Captain Robert North refused to dip his sloop*s sail, even
when threatened with being fired upon by the fort.

A

party of armed men boarded the sloop and were greeted by an
incensed North.

They were informed that North had a pair

of pistols and
21.
22.

Ibid.. reel 1 5 .
Adams, D i a r y f p. 199*

i6
if that damned rascal, Caotain Bayard, did not
produce an order to him from the L'New York]
Provincial Congress, for the request..., he
would blow his brains opt; with many more
unfriendly expressions.
Both North and the Commissioners referred the matter to
the New York Congress.

24

Wisdom prevailed, and on 19

October instructions were dispatched to the Commissioners
to leave the shipping alone unless they had a very good
2 *5
reason to suspect someone.
In response to the Continental Congress* instructions
to investigate the other possible sites,

the Mew York

Congress communicated with the Commissioners and Romans.
On 16 October both reported.

Romans stated that he could

not give an estimate for the site at Popolopen Creek, but
that work on Fort Constitution was progressing well and
cannon were being mounted.

He did consider Popolopen

Creek a good site, but West Point he felt was “at present,
to me entirely useless."

26

On 17 October the New York Congress considered that
the works were far enough along to require a garrision.
They requested four artillery companies be raised im27
mediately to man the works.
The Continental Congress
replied on 28 October authorizing one company to be raised
immediately.^ '
28*
24
25
26
27
28

This company was recruited in New York

Force. American Archives, Ser. 4 , III, P. 1293*
Ibid
Ibid
Xh id

17
City by Captain John Lamb.

On 3 November,

two .incom

plete Continental infantry companies were ordered to
the Highlands by the New York Congress.

These, were

Captain John Grennell’s comp,any of the Second New York
and Captain Benjamin L ed yard 1s company of the First New
Yor* . 29
A New York request for appointment of a commandant
was received on 6 November by the Continental Congress.
Robert Livingston and four others were selected to consider
this letter, and they reported on 8 November.

It was

resolved to appoint a colonel to command the Highlands as
a separate entity.

The New York Congress was also au

thorized to organize militia to defend the posts until
Continentals could take over.

This resolution additionally

authorized the establishment of a supply depot in the High
lands.

Robert R. Livingston, Robert T. Paine, and -John

Langdon were instructed to inspect the Highlands on their
qo
way north to confer with Major General Schuyler. ~ The
election of a commander was postponed on 9 November,
Captain John Hanson being appointed temporary commander
until the colonel should be elected.
left at that, however.

81

The matter was

On 10 November Colonel William

Alexander, better known as Lord Stirling, was instructed
to send six companies of New Jersey Continentals to the
Ap
Highlands*'**" There is no record that they ever reported,
29.
30.
31-

Force, American Archives, Ser. k, TII, p. 1323*
Paoers of the Continental Congress, reel 15*
Ibid.. reel 15*
32.
Ibid. . reel 15*

18
While this effort to obtain a garrison was going on,
Romans was becoming a source of antagonism to the Com
missioners*

They quibbled over cost estimates., for a second

blockhouse following the completion of the first.
plans were being completed,
the civilian workers.

Romans'

but problems were arising with

On 15 November Romans wrote the Com

missioners claiming that they were responsible for stirring
up the workers.
On 17 November the committee from the Continental.
Congress arrived at Fort Constitution on their inspection
tour.

Their report, dated 23 November, was highly critical.

While they found a garrison of approximately one hundred
men from the two New York companies, a considerable force
of civilian workmen, plenty of cannon,

shot, and gunpowder,

they had reservations.
We must own that we found the fort in a less
defensible situation than we had reason to
expect, owing chiefly to an injudicious dispo
sition of the labour....
The fortress is un
fortunately commanded by all the grounds about
it, and much exposed to an attack by land.
They especially pointed out that West Point dominated the
island, and that Fort Constitution was overly ambitious.
To improve the poor positioning of Romans* battery would
be very expensive in their opinion.

They mentioned that

they had been informed that Popolopen Creek was a promising
site, and suggested that qualified experts be sent to
survey the area as soon as possible.
33.
3*4-.

Force, American Archives, Ser.
Ibid., Ser. "Tig III, pp. 1657-8.

III, op. 13*59-67•

19
The New York Congress subsequently dispatched a com
mittee to investigate* the second site.

The members,

Isaac

Nicoll, Thomas Palmer, and Gilbert Drake, recommended that
the primary defensive effort be shifted to the Popolopen
Creek site.

This committee also attempted to resolve the

dispute between the Commissioners and Romans.

Their In

quiry reached the conclusion that Remans was claiming too
much power.
The final important decision of 1775 relating to the
Hudson Highlands was taken on 13 December.

On that date the

Continental Congress resolved to construct thirteen ships
of war.

Two of these ships were to be built in New York

with a target date for completion of 31 Narch 1776.
Peekskill was to be the construction site for these ships,
one to be a frigate of twenty-eight guns and the other a
frigate of twenty-four.
As the year drew to an end the crucial decision on
the location of the principle defensive work had been
made.

Hereafter, Port Constitution, after the great expense

in resources and time, was to be relegated to a secondary
role.

Popolopen Creek, which was to play the critical role

in the Campaign of 1777, had been decided upon, although
construction had not yet commenced.

The critical problem

of unified control was not yet settled.

35.
36.

George Clinton, Public Pacers of Georre Clinton,
(10 vols.; Albany: State of New York, 189971 I,
p. 132.
Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 15.

CHAPTER III
1776
The new year began with a final inquiry into the
shifting of emphasis from Constitution Island to Pcpolopen Creek.

On 3 January Pierre Van Courtlandt wrote

to the Continental Congress for the New York Committee
of Safety.

In his letter he summarized the arguments put

forth by Romans for Constitution Island and Thomas Palmer
for* the investigating committee.

Van Courtlandt stated

that the Committee of Safety was of the opinion that
Palmer was correct in his estimate that Popolopen Creek
would be both cheaper and a better defensive position*"
Before this letter arrived, Thomas Palmer and Richard
Greene 11 reached the Continental Congress on 5 January*4'
The Congress resolved, after questioning them,
That no further fortifications ought to be
erected at Martler's rock on Hudsons river,
and that a point of land at PuplopenJs kill
on the said river ought without delay to be
effectually fortified.
The New York Congress was authorized to carry out this
q
resolution.
On 13 January Van Courtlandt*s letter
1«
2*

Will Iam t5e 11 Cl a r k , e d ., Naval Documents of the American
Revolutio n . (^- vols.; Washington: Government Printing
Office, 196t), III, pp. 587-~8„
I b i d . , III, p. 636.
3* National Archives, Parers of
th >"-■ C o^11 jn on tal C on yr e s s 17?b-1.?8Q , Transcript Journals,
reel ly*
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arrived along with Romans, who was examined.^
resolution did not come until 15 February*

The final

At this date it

was decided that while no new works should be erected at
Fort Constitution,
and garrisoned*

those already begun should be finished

The new fort at Popolopen Creek should not

mount over forty cannon and be constructed of earth and
fascines.

Such Continental troops that might be stationed

there were authorized to assist in the construction under
*5
the direction of the engineers.
The command structure for the Highlands was tenta
tively organized in the early months of the year.

On 16

January Colonel Isaac Nicoll of the New York militia was
placed in command of the Highlands by the New York Congress.
At the same time Captain William Smith was appointed as the
engineer for the new fort.

Construction was begun on the

modest new fort in February under Smit h1s direction.

De

signed to mount fifteen guns, five of them heavy thirty-two
pounders,

it was named for 11the brave Gen
7
had been killed, in the attack on Quebec.

Montgomery” who

At this same time the Continental Army staff was be
ginning to realize that New York City would be the target of
the 1 776 campaign.

Flavor General Charles Lee,

sent by

Washington to inspect New York City, was the first to be

6.
7.

Ibid . . reel 15.
5*
Ibid. . reel 1 5 .
George Clinton, Public Papers o f _George Clinton. (10
vcls.; Albany: State of New York, 1899), I, P. 132.
William Smith *s “A Plan of Fort Montgomery" reproduced
in Peter J. Guthorn, American Maps and Far Fakers of
the Revolution, (Monmouth Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau
Press, ipbbTT"P* 33*

aware of the strategic importance of the Highlands,

On

5 February he wrote to Washington advising him that the
Highlands passes should be put in a defensible state and
guarded by a battalion,

Washington responded on ^ May by

ordering Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. Livingston of the
Third New York to move five of his companies to the forts
Q
and assume command if he was not outranked,
A subsequent
letter dated 8 May was sent to the New York Congress thanking
them for their efforts and advising them that Colonel Nicoll
would be relieved whenever Livingston arrived.

10

Nicoll

obstinately refused to leave Fort Constitution until 8 June,
Washington had moved the Continental Arm?/ down to New
York City by this time,

In May he dispatched the recently

promoted Brigadier General Stirling to survey the state of
the Highlands.

Stirling1s report, dated 1 June, enclosed

reports from Nicoll on the status of Fort Constitution and
Livingston on Fort Montgomery.

On his examination tour

he was accompanied by Colonel Rufus Putnam,
8.

the a r m y 1s

Lee to Washington 5 Feb. 1776; Jared Sparks, ed. ,• Corres
pondence of the Arnerlcar. Revolution, (k vo 1 s . ; Bos ton:
Little, Brown, 1853), I, pi f£TlT~
9. Washington to Henry Livingston A May 1776; George Washing
ton, Writings of Oeorme Washington, ed. by John C. Fitz
patrick, (39 vols, ; Washington: Government Print:?ng Of
fice, 1931)? V, pp. 10-11.
(Hereafter referred to as
Fitzpatrick.)
10. Pacers of the Secret
Committee of the New York Provincial Congress, Washing
ton's Headquarters Historic Site, Newburgh, H .Y. (Photo
static Copies at the United States Military Academy).
11. Peter Force, e d . , A~erican Archives: A Collection of
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anri Other -tqtj ces of Public Affairs , (9 vols.; washington
M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-1853), Series
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chief engineer, and Captain-Lieutenant Win.throp Sergeant,
an artillery officer.

They stated that both forts had a

large quantitiy of cannon,
garrisons were small.

shot, and powder, bpt that both

Each had a company of the Third New

York and two companies of militia.

Furthermore, according

to the returns, most of the ordnance was of relatively
small caliber.

The sloop Li berty« Captain Henry Palmer,

was employed by the Commissioners to provide communications
between the two forts.

Copies of the expense records

for May included in the report Indicated approximately
-i2
£'+50 were being expended each month.
Washington,
the Highlands,

confessing that he was unacquainted with

submitted recommendations on improvements

to the Commissioners on 10 June.

These recommendations had

been submitted to him by Stirling upon his return to New
York City.

For Fort Constitution, he recommended that the

works be enclosed to make it less liable to capture by a
sudden attack.

At this time the nature of the fortress

was more properly that of an extended battery, rather
a regular enclosed fort.

than

Relying on an extensive marsh to

protect its flank, it was exposed to attack from the rear.
Fort Montgomery he found in a much better state.

All he

advised there was that the planned works be completed.

He

and Colonel Putnam did notice one flaw,
12.

Stirling to Washington 1 Jure 1776; Library of Congress,
George Wash in g ton Pacers , (Pr e s iden t-ial Paper s M i cr of Ilm s ,
196l7, S e r i e s ^ , reel 36.
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I would also advertise that the Hill on the op
posite rsouthj Side of the Creek, & the Mouth
thereof, be cleared in such a Manner, that an
Engineer can lav out a proper regular Work on
it, if hereafter be found necessary,^3
Washington now began to recognize the vital importance
of the Highlands, and established a unified command of the
Continental Army there.

On 14 June he ordered Colonel

James Clinton to report to the Highlands with his regiment
(the Second Mew York) and relieve Lieutenant Colonel
Livingston.

He was also to relieve the Commissioners and

assume overall command of the area.
As these are or may become Posts of' infinite
Importance, especially the lower one [Port
Montgomery^; I cannot Sufficiently impress
upon you the Necessity of putting them jlnto a
fit Posture of Defense, without Delay.-4
The New York Congress dismissed the Commissioners on the
same day, with a reprimand to Captain Jonathan Lawrence for
storing tea,

1v
"that useless herb," at Port Constitution*'

On 12 July the British made their first penetration of
the Hudson Hi ver.

On that day two British warships,

the

frigates Phoenix (Captain Hyde Parker, forty-five guns) and
Rose (Captain James Wallace,

thirty-two guns), with some

tenders sailed past the fortifications on Manhattan Island
and penetrated to the Tappan Zee.

They were guided from

the anchorage at Staten Island by Robert Sneden, a New
-j£
Jersey loyalist.
A deserter subsequently reported that
i.3.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid*. Ser. 3E, reel 16, vol. I, pp. 324-7.
Fitzpatrick, V, pp. 139-9*
Livingston to Stirling 11 June 1776; Force, American
Arr»M res , S e r . A , VI, p . 1405*
Adr1an C . Lei b y , Revolutionary War in the Hackensack
Valley, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
19 o 2), p . 44•

their mission was to destroy the two Continental frigates
being built at Poughkeepsie.

17

Washington immediately wrote

to Brigadier General George Clinton requesting^that he call
out his brigade of Orange and Ulster County militia.

18

George Clinton was James Clinton's younger brother, and
both were distant cousins of Lieutenant General Sir Henry
Clinton,

the British second-in-command.

A letter was also

sent to the New York Congress suggesting that fireships
1b
be prepared to destroy the British vessels. ''
The militia mobilized, and manned the forts and both
banks of the river between the Highlands and New York City.
Although Washington had anticipated two thousand militia,
?o
only nine hundred were actually on duty at any one time.
On 14 July George Clinton assumed command of Fort Constitu
tion.

He recommended to the Committee of Safety that they

purchase old sloops to use as fireships.

He also requested
21
two row-galleys and a whaleboat for reconnaissance.
Washington suspected that the British ships were on a

mission to sieze the Highlands,
17.

19.
20.

21.

or were going; to distribute

Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington 27 July 1776;
Joshua and Jedediah Huntington, "Huntington Papers:
Correspondence of the Brothers Joshua and Jedediah
Huntington During the Period of the American Revolution
1771 *“1783," Connecticut Historical Society Collections .
XX (1927), p. 71518.
Washington to George Clinton
12 .July 1776; Fitzpatrick, V, p. 265.
Washington to New York Congress 12 July 1776; "Papers
of the Secret Committee."
Hugh Jameson, "The Organization of the Militia of the
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(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan
1936), 'Appendix A.
G. Clinton to New York Committee of Safety 14 July 1776
Clinton, Pu.bl.ic Papers. I, pp. 249-50.
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arms to the New York loyalists,
22
his rear. “

touching off an uprising in

While the channel in the Tappan Zee limited

their effectiveness as raiders,
of the range of shore batteries.

it also kept the ships out
To dislodge the ships

Washington requested Governors Trumbull of Connecticut and
Cooke of Rhode Island to send several of their states*
row^-gallies to the river.
being prepared,

27

While these defences were

the ships maneuvered in the river without

doing anything of consequence.

On 16 July fourteen fire

ships were readied at Poughkeepsie, but they were not
24
launched at that time.
This lack of action produced
25
considerable annoyance among the militia.
The hastily assembled American flotilla of five armed

26 left its anchorage at Spuyten Duyvil Creek, the

gallies ”

north end of Manhattan Island, on 3 August.

They moved

upriver and engaged the frigates for two hours under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Tupper.

After scoring

several hits on the Phoenix, damage sustained by all the
gallies forced them to retire to Manhattan.
22.
23.
25.

27*

'

Washington.

Vla.shin.gton to Congress 14 July 1776; Fitzpatrick, V, p. 275*
Washington to Trumbull, to Cooke 15 July 1776; Ibid..
V, 0 0 . 2.82-3.
24.
Jacobus Van Zandt to G.
Clinton 16 July 1776; Clinton, Public Parers. I, 0 0 . 2.54-5,
Colonel Isaac Nicoll to G. Clinton 20 J u l v T ? ? 6 ; Ibid. ,
I, pp. 263-4.
26.
The Washington, the flagship;
the L ady W a.oh 1r r-1or : the Spitfire ; the Shark :' and the
V/hi ting. Sharlr and Whi tinm were from Connecticut,
Washi noton and Srd tf^ r e from Rhode Island.
Tupper to Washington 3 August 1776; Force, American
Archives. Ser. 5, I, PP» 766-7.
Another eyewitness
report is enclosed in Greene to Washington 8 August
1776, Ibid,, Ser. 5, I, p. 751*
Lack of training as
a squadron seems to have hampered, its effective use.

27
referred to this as “a Smart engagement” and commended
everyone involved, but apparently realized that it was
inconclusive,

28

A second attempt on the frigates was made on the night
of 16 August.
Peekskill.

This time two fireships were launched from

They were carried down by the current and failed

to destroy either of the warships, although they grappled
2Q
with the Rose for ten minutes. " One tender was destroyed,
and the British apparently considered this a sufficient threat
and took advantage of a favorable wind to run back past
Manhattan Island and rejoin the fleet.

80

Washington or

dered a bounty of $50 to be paid to each man on the fire
ships who was burned and $L0 to the others in an unusual
31
recognition of their bravery.^
This raid, while accomplishing very little for the
British,

stimulated considerable American concern for the

Highlands.

The ease with which the British ships had

penetrated the obstacles at Manhattan increased awareness
of the necessity for sealing the passage in the Highlands.
Washington bolstered the Continental forces at the forts
by ordering Second Lieutenant Thomas Machin of Colonel
Henry Knox's Artillery Regiment to the Highlands on 21
July.
28.
2-9*
30.
31,

32

Machin was to serve Colonel James Clinton as an

Washington to Cooke 5 August 1776; Fitzpatrick, V, p. 373Washington to Congress 1? August 1776; Ibid. . V, p.
.
Washington to Congress 18 August 1776; Ibid . , V, p. *152.
General Order for 18 August 1776; V/ash in gt on Parer s f
Ser.
reel 26.
32. Washington to Machin 21
July 1776; Washington to George Clinton 21 July 1776;
Fitzpatrick, V, p. 319.
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engineer, and in the event of an attack could do double
duty in assisting with the artillery.

The disastrous

defeat on Long Island on 2? August necessitated the con
centration of Continentals for the defense of New York
City.

Six hundred militia were called out as a means of

providing manpower to hasten the completion of the forts,
and an average of two hundred were at work every day for
two non th s .^
The N e w York Committee of Safety debated the best
means for obstructing the river at Port Montgomery, and
eventually decided to stretch a chain across to Anthony's
Nose.

For this purpose they wrote to Major General Philip

Schuyler requesting the chain which had been captured the
previous year at Sorel in Canada.-

To protect the frigates

and supply depot at Fishkill a small earthwork was con
structed by Machin at Red Hook, on the northern edge of
Peekskill Pay.

Subsequently named Fort Independence,

garrison consisted of three companies of militia.

its

A small

detachment of Continentals provided guards for the stores
themselves.

Stirling's recommendation that the south

side of Popolopen Creek be fortified was also acted upon,
and by 8 September the first cannon were mounted by James
30
Clinton.^''

This new fort, soon to surpass the original

33 • Jameson, "Militia of the Middle St rites," Appendix A*
3k, Robert Yates to Schuyler C29 July l?76j; Papers of the
Secret Committee,
35. Emma L. Patterson, Peekskill in th e American Revolution.
(Peekskill, N . Y . : Friendly Town Association, 19 ^ ) , P • 17
36. James Clinton to G. Clinton 8 Sep. 1775; Clinton, Publ1c
P a p e r s . I, p. 337.
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Fort Montgomery, was named Fort Clinton, apparently after
one of the brothers.
While James Clinton reported to the New York
Congress
*■*
that work was progressing well in September, he did com
plain that he needed more men, nails, and good food.

He

especially felt that the current total force of ?6^ men,
only five companies of which were Continentals of the
Second New York, was about one thousand men less than
necessary.

37
1

Washington also urged the New York Congress

to take "the utmost attention and every exertion" to
secure the forts.

The Continental Congress determined

on 23 September that the Highlands required a larger
garrison and directed Washington to station a full battalion of regulars there.

39
y

Lieutenant General Sir William! Howe had shaken his
army into action and landed at Kip's Bay on Manhattan on
15 September,

but his advance had ground to a halt in the

skirmish the next day at Harlem Heights.

While he pon

dered his next move he dispatched at second naval expedi
tion up the river.

At 9:15 AM on 9 October the frigates

Phoenix. Roebuck (Captain Andrew Snape Hamond, forty-four
guns), and Tartar (Captain Cornwaithe Ommanney,

twenty-eight

guns), together with the schooner Trya] and two tenders ran
past the ineffectual Forts Washington and Lee.
37.
38.
39*

The only

Force, American Arch 1v a s . Ser. 5>
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Washington to New York Congress 12 Sep. 1776; Fitz
patrick, VI, p.
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American vessels in the vicinity wisely realized that they
were overmatched and attempted to flee upriver.

The swifter

British ran two large ships ashore at Yonkers ,§md destroyed
one of them.

They also sank a sloop which was carrying

David Bushnell's submarine) the Turtle. and captured a
40
merchant schooner and two row-galleys.
These galleys
were the Crane and Independence. the former a veteran of the
4-1
earlier raid.
The British ships remained anchored at
Dobbs Perry for the entire course of the campaign through
Westchester County, leading Washington to recognize that
they were being used to disrupt his communications to New
42
Jersey.
This increased the importance of Kings Perry
which now became the shortest route available to the
Americans.
The militia turned out to meet this threat as they had
for the previous one, and saw as little action.

Major

General William Heath dispatched five hundred Continentals
and three artillery pieces to stiffen the militia,

but the

majority returned from Dobbs Perry when they realized
41
that the British were not on an active raid. ^ On 12
October Howe landed on T h r o g fs Neck in Westchester to
40.
41.

42.
43.
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begin his attempted envelopment of Washington*s army.

This

same day the Secret Committee of the New York Congress wrote
to Washington requesting that a "good" regiment and a "good"
engineer be sent to secure the Highlands passes to prevent
kk
a loyalist uprising.
Events in Westchester rapidly worsened.

After being

thwarted at Throg* s Neck, Howe shifted further east and
on IB October landed at P e l l 1s Point.

Despite a sharp en

gagement with a brigade under Colonel John Glover at EastChester shortly after landing,

the British army ground

relentlessly toward White Plains.

Washington retired to

the Croton River after an inconclusive battle at White
Plains on 28 October.

In a council of war on 6 November,

attended by the general officers of the army, it was decided
to divide the Continentals into four parts to allow a
flexible posture.

A garrison was to be left at Fort

Washington to preserve a last foothold on Manhattan.

A

further three thousand men were to be stationed "at Peeks
kill and the passes in the Highlands for the defence of
those Posts

£,3 erecting Fortifications &c."

The flexibil

ity was to be achieved by leaving Major General Charles Lee,
the second-in-command, on the eastern side of the river with
the regiments recruited from New England while Washington
moved to the west side with the remainder.

The provision

was made that Lee should rejoin the main army if circumstances
44.

Robert R. Livingston to Washington 12 Oct. 1776;
Sparks, Correspondence. I, pp. 295-6.
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so dictated,

b-6
"

This last point was repeated in Washington's

orders to Lee leaving him in charge of the troops left on
the east side.^^
This arrangement of forces provided a great degree of
flexibility, especially since Howe's next objective was
unclear.

In fact the only inherent weakness was the conA7
mitment of a large garrison to Port Washington. 1 Howe
rapidly recognized this and on 16 November captured the
fort with its awkward garrison.

This resounding disaster

exposed Washington to being chased through New Jersey,

but

it was also "the lesson that made him sophisticated on the
UQ
subject of forts.11'
Hereafter, he would never construct,
works too extensive to be properly garrisoned or as poorly
situated.

This lesson would be embodied In the Highlands

in 1?78,
The garrison, commander selected for the Highlands was
the Massachusetts-born Major General William Heath,

the

sixth ranking general in the Continental Army.

He was
La
ordered, to report to Peekskill with his division'y on 8
<0
November and arrived two days later.v
Washington personally
L5.

"Minutes of the Continental Councils of War," 6 Nov.
1776; W a sh in ort on Pa Derg. Ser. JF 9 reel 25.
*4-6. Washington to Lee 10 Nov. 1776; Fitzpatrick, VI, pp. 263-5.
47. James T. Flexrer, Oeorpre Washington in the American
Revolution, (Boston; L1111 e , i~§?PT) , p p . 17-4-3”*
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In the Continental Army the
organization of divisions and brigades was far more flex
ible than in World War II.
Just as is currently the prac
tice in Vietnam, battalions and regiments were shifted
from one major unit to another with high frequency.
While
this is a headache for the historian, it allowed a great
deal of flexibility to meet strategic and tactical needs.
50, Heath, Memoirs. p. 75•
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inspected the Highlands for the first time on 11 November
while the army was crossing at Kings Ferry.

On this inspec

tion tour he was accompanied by Heath, Stirling,

the Clinton

brothers, Colonel Putnam, and Brigadier General Thomas Mif
flin.

At this time he noted that West Point should be

fortified.

Washington crossed into New Jersey on 12 Novem

ber leaving Heath in command of the troops and posts in the
Highlands.

Washington stressed the importance of these

fortifications and implored Heath to do his best to secure
them.-51
Heath promptly distributed his troops to protect both
sides of the river.

James Clinton's Second New York Regi

ment continued at the forts.

Two regiments of Brigadier

General Samuel Holden Parsons' brigade were sent to guard
the Clove on the west bank while the remaining three, together
with Brigadier General John Morin Scott's brigade of three
regiments, covered the eastern passes.

Brigadier General

George Clinton's militia brigade remained at Peekskill as
a reserve f o r c e . " '
Returns for lk- November indicate that the garrison of
Forts Montgomery and Clinton numbered 1131, s.nd that of Fort
Constitution 388.

It must be noted that the numbers of

Continentals were a mere 222 and 161 respectively*-'-'

The

terms of enlistment of most of these men ended on 1 January
51*
53*

Ibid., p. ?6.
The actual order to Heath is in Fitz
patrick, VI, p. 9.
52, Heath, Memoirs. pp. 76-?*
Force, Ameri can Archives f Ser. 5, III, pp. 679-80.

1?77*

Lee*s force of three divisions was concentrated at

North Castle*

On 16 November it numbered 10,768 men in

twenty-five regiments, but had a total effective strength
of only 5,162.
On 20 November the British struck out swiftly to in
vade New Jersey, forcing the evacuation of Fort Lee.

As

Washington retreated towards Philadelphia he wrote to Lee
to rejoin the army as soon as possible.

Lee was requested

to leave behind only those men whose service would expire
very shortly.

This letter was carried by a cavalryman

who also bore a verbal message which was'reported to Heath.
The conflicting interpretations of this order by the two
generals resulted in the most bitter quarrel, and the nest
important, which had yet occurred in the Highlands.
Lee considered his force to be a command independent
t0
of W a s h i n g t o n . H e acknowledged receipt of Washington1s
order, which he called "a Recommendation not a positive
order," by writing to Heath.

Lee requested that Heath,

since he was closer to Washington,
thousand of his

send a force of two

own men across the river,

inform Washington

and await further orders.

Lee promised to renla.ee them as
<8
soon as he finished "a necessary Jobb." y
Heath, who had

been informed by Washington *s courier that the troops were
5;t.
5556.

58.

Ibid. , Ser. 5, III, p. 710.
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Heath,
r s . p. 79*
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1776-1778,11 New Ycrk Historical Society Collections.
V (1872), p p . 201-2.
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to come from Lee's force and not his own, refused.-

In

his letter to Lee, Heath stressed that it would take him
as long to collect the two thousand men as it would for
Lee to reach Kings Perry, and that he had positive instruc
tions from Washington, which he quoted, not to weaken his
...
60
position.

Lee's "Jobb" involved the attempt to destroy Major
Robert Rogers' loyalist force, the Queen's Rangers,
forming In Westchester. 61

then

Ke further procrastinated by

ordering Brigadier General John Nixon to break his brigade
62
into small parties to forage.
The next day, 23 November,
he wrote to Heath chastising him for interpreting Washington's
orders as being so binding that he could not break a "tittle"
to save an army.

Lee informed Heath that while he was

sending Glover's brigade to Peekskill to cover the passes,
Heath should have two thousand men ready to march on the
twenty-fifth.^
Heath replied on 2*4- November that
would be left with a

if he complied he

mere 328 men for the

forts since the

militia's and Scott's brigade's enlistments would all be
up In ten days.

He stated that he would send the men

without Washington's orders if he felt Washington wanted
them, but since he knew Washington did not, he would not
59*
60.
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61.
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Ibid.,
V, p. 30k.

36
order his troops to march.

64

Heath then sent a dispatch to

Washington informing, him of the state of affairs and reques66
ting advice as soon as possible. v This advice reached
him on the twenty-sixth reaffirming that the troops should
come from Lee's force, not H e a t h 1s . ^
Lee responded very sarcastically to Heath on 26
November, accusing Heath of believing himself to be as
independent as if he were at the Straits of Magellan.

Then

Lee 11pul led rank” and claimed as Heath's superior the right
to issue orders to Heath.

If anything should happen to

Washington because these troops did not arrive in time, Lee
67
claimed, Heath would be responsible.
■ Lee also wrote to
Washington on that same day denying that it was his intention
to strip the Highlands.

All he proposed to do was shift

Heath's men to New Jersey and replace them from his own
force.

There was no risk involved in this maneuver in Lee's

estimation.
The matter finally came to a head when the two generals
confronted each other on 30 November at Peekskill.

When

Heath refused to send one man under his orders, Lee certified
in writing that he had assumed command of the Highlands.
He then ordered two regiments,
Continental Infantry,

the Seventh and Twenty-first

to be prepared to march in the morning

64. Heath to Lee 24 Nov. 17?6; Ibid.. V, p. 305 .
6 5 . Heath to Washington 24 Nov. 1776; Heath, Memoir, pp.
66. Robert H. Harrison (for Washington) to Heath 25 Nov.
1776; Ibid.f p. 84.
6 7 . Lee to Heath 26 Nov. 1776; Lee, "Lee Papers," V, pp.
68. Lee to. Washington 26 Nov. 1776; Ibid.. V, p. 315*

82-3.
313-4,
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from Continental Village,

the barracks area near Peekskill.

6o

'

Lee also wrote to Washington informing him that he was
marching to New Jersey.

In this letter he blamed any delay
•70

and reduction in the number of troops on H eat h.'

To

Heath's amazement, Lee countermanded these orders on 1
December.

That same day Scot's brigade's enlistments ex

pired and only fifty men reenlisted.

Lee's force crossed

Kings Ferry from 1 to 3 December, leaving trails of blood
in the snow because so many men were shoeless. 71
Lee considered Heath sadly misguided, writing to
Major General Joseph Spencer that Heath was "confident
that all the movements of the Enemy in every part of the
continent are only feints,

that they only mean to weaken
72
him, and that when He is taken all is lost."'
Heath was
actually more aware of the vital importance of the Highlands,
and wisely refused to be a party to Lee's attempts at selfg]crifieation.

Heath recognized, that the maintenance of an

army~in~beirg under Washington was of primary importance,
bi-1 tc a*c t^1pr w ^ th the Commander—in—Chief realized that con
trol of the Hj. ghlands formed an independent department from
the field armies, and fell directly under the control of
Washington.
Lee failed to join Washington.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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The statement is also found
in Lee, "Lee Pacers,11 V, p. 376.
Lee to Washington 70 Nov. 1776; Lee, "Lee Papers,"
V, pp. 322-7 /
Heath, Memoirs. p. 88.
Lee to Snencer 2 Dec. 1776; Lee, "Lee Pacers," V,
p. 328.
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with M

r

force in the hills of New Jersey around Norristown.

where he posed a real threat to the British lines of
communications•

While this policy was to cause Washington

some real problems at the time, he quickly realized its
advantages and adopted it in subsequent campaigns*

73
^

Lee

himself was captured by the British at Basking Ridge, New
Jersey, on 13 December*
On 9 December Washington requested Heath to march with
Parsons8 Connecticut Continental brigade on a raid into
New Jersey to relieve some of the pressure on the rapidly
7J4,
disintegrating main a rm y . '
Heath moved the brigade to
Kings Ferry on the next day and entered New Jersey on the
eleventh.

^

The three regiments of the brigade were accom

panied by a field piece and a howitzer,

the standard

proportion of artillery in the Continental Arm:/.

Colonel

Isaac Nicoll was left in charge at Peekskill during H e a t h 8s
?6
absence. " Heath chose as his target a loyalist regiment
supposedly at Hackensack.

The attempted surprise on Id

December netted, negligable results as the loyalists had
changed encampments, and a second attempt on 18 December at
Bergen was only slightly more effective.

The troops re-

77

turned, to the Highlands on 23 December. ‘ '
In spite of all these movements and distractions
73.
7d.
75*

77.

Flexner, Vfa.shington in the Revo 1ut.ion. p. 165 .
Washington to Heath 9 Dec. 1776; Fitzpatrick, VI, p. 335*
Heath, Memo!r. p. 90.
76. Orderly Book of Norris
Graham*s Regiment of Orange County Militia, New York
(City) Public Library Manuscripts Division, (photostat
of original in private collection).
Heath, Memoirs . pp. 91-d.
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construction continued on the Highlands defenses.

The New

York Congress employed a Captain Hazelwood from Pennsylvania
as an advisor on obstructing the river.

In anticipation of

the arrival of the chain from Schuyler on 3 November,

Captain-

Lieutenant Machin prepared for Installation at Forts Clinton
and Montgomery«
of pointed logs.

The chain was to be supported by rafts
79

Machin frantically worked to get the

chain emplaced, following the scare occasioned by the fall
of Forts Washington and Lee.
An inquiry was held,

However,

the chain broke twice.

but sworn affidavits from James Clinton,

Captain Abram Swartwout, Captain James Rosekrans, and Lieu
tenant Daniel Lawrence revealed that it was due to specific
faulty parts and not to the overall construction.

30

Machin

reported that he could make modifications and _place the
8i
chain properly in the spring.
In the interim it was judged necessary by the Committee
of Safety to emplace some obstacle.

On 26 November Robert

Livingston conferred with Heath and George Clinton, and it
was decided to emplace chevaux-de~frise at Polopel Island
82
just above the Highlands.
George Clinton was dispatched
with two regiments (five hundred men) to garrison Fort
Constitution and construct the chevaux.
78.
79*

Minutes of the Secret Committee, lA Oct. 1776.
Also
John McKesson to George Clinton 31 Oct. 1.776; Clinton,
Pnbl1c Parers« I, p. bob.
8). M. P u t t or her, O h s t r uc t ions to the N a y i g a t 1.on of
H u d roe 1s

80.
81.

82.

He arrived on 30

( Al'reny:

*'i'r.sell,

Force, A?°r ic?.n ftrr.hlv o s . Ser.
Ser. % ' l T T ,

T M 3 .. Ser.

op.

838-9 .

5, III, pp. 338-9.

I 8 60 "), p.

5, III,

64.

lUO.

10
OO
November and. began work the next day, ^
two Continental frigates,

In addition,

the

the Conrress (Captain Tudor, de-

si gened for twenty-eight guns) and the Montgomery (Captain
Lawrence,

twenty-four) were ordered from Peekskill to

Kingston*s Roundout Creek for protection while they were
being finished.

81

In the closing days of 1776 the Highlands were recog
nized to be of great strategic importance.
If the ^British] persevere in their plan of sub
jugating these States to the Yoke of Great Bri
tain, they must, in proportion to their knowledge
of the country, be more and more convinced of the
necessity of their becoming masters of the Hudson*s
River, which will give them the entire command of
the water C o m m m i cat Ion with the Indian nations,
effectively pr ever t ai! 1 ints^cours ° between the
Eastern end Southern Confederates, divide our
strength, and enfeeble every effort for our com
mon preservation and s ecurity,
The Commander-in-Chief had become presonally convinced of this
fact, and saw to it that the works were vigorously carried
out.

He was to acquire from the events of November and Decem

ber not only an appreciation of the use of the greater High
lands range, of which the Morristown hills form a part, as
a base of operations, but also as a base for raids against
British outposts.

83*
81,
8^.

George Clinton to New York Congress 1 Dec. 1776;
Clinton, Publi c Parer s , I , p . 11 0.
Force, American A r c h i v e s , Ser. 5, III, p. 330•_
New York Congress to Continental Congress 28 [Nov7)
177b; Ibid., Ser. 5, III, pp. 331-1.

CHAPTER TV
BRITISH PLANNING FOR THE 1?7? CAMPAIGN
The British ministry had. not forgotten the lessons on
the importance of the Hudson River learned so painfully
during the Colonial Wars.

As early as 12 June 1775 it was

suggested that British forces sieze New York City and oper
ate south from Lake Champlain.1

Admiral Lord Howe wrote

to Lord George Germain on 25 September 1775 stressing the
need to shift the center of the war from Boston to New York
City, and also suggested that a secondary force operate
from Canada as far as Crown Point on Lake Champlain.
These suggestions were adopted in 1??6.

2

Sir William

Howe evacuated Boston on 17 March and captured New York
City in a series of battles culminating In the capture of
Fort Washington on 16 November 1776,

Governor Sir Guy

Carleton and Lieutenant General John Burgoyne attempted
to sieze control of Lake Champlain.

However,

through

Brigadier General Benedict Arnold's brilliant delaying
actions,
1.

2.

they were frustrated.

Gage to North 12 June 1775; Sir John Fortescue, e d.,
myi o C o m e s n o r d e r o e o r Kirs* Georme the Third From 1 7 6 0
to December 178sj O n vols.: 2nd e d . ; London: Frank
Cass and Co., l?6^), ITT, pp. 21-W5.
Lord Howe to Germain 2.5 Sep. 1775; Historical Miamisenlots Commission, Report on the waruscrlots of Mrs.
Stoof ord-Sackvi lie of Dray ton H o ’m e a Northa.mpsh ire
(2 vols.; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1910)
IT, P. 9.

k2

With this background,

the British armies settled into

winter quarters and bep*an preparing for the coming campaign.
On 13 December 1776 the King suggested to LorcLNorth that
Burgoyne should move down from Canada to meet Howe moving
up from New York City at Albany.tative suggestion as the King,

This was just a ten

to .judge from the small nor-

tion of his correspondence devoted to military subjects,
believed, in leaving the actual conduct of the war to Germain.
Germain on the other hand believed that the officer on the
spot understood the war better and deferred planning responsibility to the .generals in North America.
Howe's initial plan submitted for ministerial approval
was -dated 30 November 1776, when Washington was in full re
treat.

It called for a ten thousand man force to move

towards Boston from Rhode Island while a two thousand man
garrison retained Newport.

Sir Henry Clinton, who had sxezed

Newport, 'was to command this force.

Five thousand men would

hold Mew York City while ten thousand moved up the Hudson to
Albany.

A final eight thousand men would occupy New Jersey

until the fall, when the completion of the other operations
freed forces for a drive through Pennsylvania and Virginia.
This would be followed by the conquest of the southern colonies during the winter.
3«
£4*.
5.

This plan required a reinforcement

King to North 13 Dec. 1776; Fortescue, Correspondence of
George the Third t III, op. 406— 7.
Gerald S. Brown, The American Secr0tary : The Colonial
PoliC’
,r o L o ^ d Geor0"0 Germau n . 1 7 *79— 1 078 , (A m Arbor,
Mich.: University of Mi ehigan Press, 1963), P* ^9•
William Howe to Germain 30 Nov. 1776; Manuscripts of
Stopford —Sackvi11 e , II, pp. A q - 5 1 ,
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of fifteen thousand men and profoundly upset Germain.^
During the winter Burgoyne had arrived in England
carrying Carleton*s proposals for the 1777 campaign.

On

10 December he had an interview with Germain in which he
presented this proposal and his own modifications*

The

essence of this plan was that a reinforced army from Canada
would drive down the Mohawk and possibly the Connecticut
rivers.

There was no hint of cooperate on with the main
7
army, or of operations on the Hudson.
A letter from Howe dated 20 December arrived on 23
February proposing a radical change in plans based on the
idea that the capture of Philadelphia would be easy.

This

new plan called for a two thousand man garrison for Bhode
Island and four thousand to hold New York City.

The main

push of ten thousand men would move from New Jersey and
sieze Philadelphia.

A further three thousand men would

operate on the lower Hudson.

If any further men were sent
q
they could be used for additional operations.
Washington promptly took advantage of the British

cessation of operations for the winter to score the crucial
victories at Trenton and Princeton.

This forced Howe to

pull back his outposts from the Delaware River and abandon
his occupation of most of New Jersey.
As a result of these setbacks, Howe revised his plans
7*
8.
9.

Manusor? ots of Stooford-Sackvtlle.
Brown, Amor isen Secretary, p. 94.
Manuscripts of Stnrford-Sackvilie *

II, p. 222,
II, pp. 52-3*
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on 20 January.

This plan was received and approved by both

the King and Germain on 3 March 1777, and Howe was notified
immediately.

This new plan definitely established that

Howe's objective would be Philadelphia,

and that any other

operation would depend solely on the number of reinforcements
sent,

Germain and the King both approved of this objective,

which did not mention in any way a joint operation on the
Hudson.

It did provide, however, for keeping the main army

between Washington1s force and the Hudson.

10

On 5 March the King read a memo from Burgoyne presen
ting a modified plan for the Canadian army.

In this plan

he strongly urged that an operation be conducted down, the
Mohawk River, and suggested Lieutenant Colonel Barry St.
Leger as the obvious choice for its command.

In the main

operation, he recommended that the commander decide on his
objective (Albany,

into Massachusetts, or down the Gonnecti-

cut River) after the campaign began.

11

This plan was ap-

proved, and Germain prepared instructions for Burgoyne, who
had been selected to lead the Canadian army.

12

Burgoyne*s

force was composed of over seven thousand regulars, St. Leger*s
of several hundred regulars, a regiment of loyalists, and
several hundred Indians.

Carleton remained in Canada with

thirty-seven hundred regulars.
10.
11.

11

Brown, American Secretary, p. 9^ •
Fortescue, Correspondence of George the Third, III,
pp. 443-4.

12.

Germain to King

13*

A n n ua l

R r‘rri 3 Kov*

18 Mar. 179?; Thi d .. ITT,

p. 42?.

or a Vi ew of

Pol 1 t i c s , an d

the F

1

sto^y t

L i terature Far the Vear 1777.(London:
Dodsley, 1 7 W T ,
p. I 7*5.

Printed for J.

Becent scholarship has decisively proved that a junction
of Howe and Burgoyne at Albany was never considered essential
to the campaign.

Burgoyne was expected to he able to reach

Albany on his own, and only after the end of 1777 was a
1id
British cordon to be established along the Hudson.
Even
in his defense before Parliament Burgoyne admitted that he
expected to winter at Albany.

15

Germain wrote Carleton on

26 March informing him of the instructions which had been
issued to Burgoyne giving him freedom of action until Howe
should join him at Albany.

16

This looseness, which also

included approving Howe's plans for Philadelphia on 26
March, was designed deliberately to allow flexibility to
17
meet unexpected circ\?mstances. 1
Burgoyne and Sir Henry Clinton, who was also on leave
in England, met for dinner on 10 March.

They discussed their

forthcoming roles, and Clinton became convinced, that while
no physical junction was planned, Whitehall did expect the
campaign to be decisive and that cooperation would be ne~
18
cessary. ~ Burgoyne departed England on 27 March, and ar
rived at Quebec on 6 May.

Clinton arrived at New York on

5 July.
111.
15*

17 *
18.

Brown, American Secretary, p. 101.
ohn
A -State of the Ex red 1 te on from Canada as
laid before the House of Commons, (2nd e d • j London: 1.
Almon, 1780; Reprint e d . ; New York: Arno Press, 1969),
pp. 15-6.
16.
Germain to Carleton 26 Mar.
17 ??: Mann script 7 of S tc.mf or»d—Sackville. 1 1 , pp • 61 — 3 •
Hr o w n , Ameyri can Secretary. p. 10 5.
William
Vi 11 cox , "Too Mary Cooks : Prit sh Planning
Before Saratoga, " -Tonr^al of British Stud e s . II (Novem
ber , 1962), p . 59 * Willi am b. V i 11 c ox, Portrai t of a
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Confusion began to arise when Howe changed his plans
again.

In a letter of 2 April, received on 18 May by.Ger

main, he announced that he was abandoning New Jersey and
attacking Pennsylvania by sea vzith eleven thousand men.
Major General Tryon would be left with a corps of three thou
sand loyalists to operate either on the Hudson or in Connec
ticut as circumstances dictated.

Garrisons of forty-seven

hundred and twenty-four hundred men would be left in New
York and Rhode Island respectively.
formed Carleton of this change,

On 5 April he had in

so Burgoyne was well aware

of it, as well as the fact that H o w e 1s campaign would start
relatively l a t e . ^
The old myth of the "pigeonholed dispatch11 has been
finally laid to rest.
secretaries,

Christian D'Oyley, o n e 'of Germain's

supposedly neglected to send a message to Howe

telling him to move to Albany in support of Burgoyne.
fact the letter was sent, and received on 5 June,

In

informing

Howe of Burgoyne's plans and instructions.

No mention was
20
made of any cancellation of the Philadelphia thrust.
Howe's final change of plans was expressed on 16 July.
By then, of course,
any coordination.

it was too late for Germain to exercise
In this letter Howe stated explicitly

that he was sailing against Philadelphia.

He believed that

even if Washington siezed the opportunity to move against
Burgoyne,
19.
20.

there was no need to worry since Burgoyne had

Both letters are in Manuscripts of Sto.pfo^d-Gackvl lle .
II, pp. 63-6 .
Brown, American Secretary, pp. 112-5-

4?
enough men to take care of himself.

If this eventuality

occurred, Howe stated that he would reinforce Clinton.
Clinton, who would he left in charge at New York City, could
then operate against Washington's rear.

But he expected

that his move would draw Washington south, freeing Burgoyne
from having any problems other than transport.

21

At this point the actual Campaign of 1777 got underway.
Events in. America had not been at a standstill, however,

and

to properly understand the campaign it is necessary to
review them.

But it is significant to note that none of the

five principal British planners (Germain, Burgoyne, Howe,
Carleton, and Clinton) properly recognized the value of the
Highlands* the one really crucial factor in the success of
operations for the year.

21.

Howe to Germain 16 July 1776; Manuscripts of StoofordSackvilla. IT, pp. 72-3.

CHAPTER V
PRELIMINARY MANEUVERS OP THE 1777 CAMPAIGN
As the new year began in the Highlands, enlistments of
the Continental troops expired.

Some men did reenlist on the

spot, but until the new Continental Line could be raised the
situation was considered dangerous.

A call was sent out for

one thousand militia to be mobilized to fill the void.

Prom

1 January to 31 March an average of 250 were actually on
duty, and they provided a weak, but sufficient, force.

1

The

major fear of the generals in the Highlands at this time was
9
not a British attack, but loyalists."
When Washington began his winter offensive operations
in southern New Jersey he became very conscious of the ad
vantages of a demonstration against New York City to ease
the pressure on his position.

On 5 January he ordered

Major General William Heath to gather four thousand militia,
and after leaving a sufficient garrison in the Highlands,
a
to advance on New York City.-' Heath gathered his troops
1.

Hugh Jameson, "The Organization of the Militia of the
Middle States During the War for Independence 1775-178111
(unpublished. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
1936), Appendix B.
2. George Clinton, Public Papers
of George Clinton. (10 vols.; Albany: State of New York,
1899’Ti ^ passim.
3* Washington to Heath 5 Jan.
1 ? 7 ? ; Willi am Heath, Memoirs of Major-Generni. Wi ] 1 iam
Heath By Hjr^eelf , e d , by William Abbatt, ”7 Vew York:
William Abbatt, 1901; New York: Arno Press, 1968),
pp. 97-8.
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49
at several locations in Westchester County and moved forward
on 1? January.

The three columns reached Kings Bridge,

posite the north end of Manhattan,
the eighteenth.

op

just before„gunrise on

Their advance was noticed by an alert

sentry, and they were unable to achieve a surprise of the
outpost there.

4

Heath then tried to bluff the 350 men in

the fort into, surrendering,

but they knew strong reinforce

ments were nearby and held out.^

Heath remained in the

vicinity skirmishing until 29 January when a council of war
d.ecided that nothing could be achieved, and that a with
drawal should take place.

The Americans, then fell back
A
to form a cordon through Westchester County.~
Washington had advanced to Morristown in the meantime,

and he remained there for the remainder of the winter.

On

20 February he wrote to Brigadier C-eneral Alexander McDougall,
in command in the Highlands since 9 February when Heath had
returned to Massachusetts.

Washington was deeply concerned

with the safety of the forts and recommended that the infan
trymen at the fo^ts be trained in the use of the cannon
7

until regular artillerymen could be stationed there.'

George Clinton assured Washington that the forts would be
in shape for the opening of the campaign.^
4.
6.
7.

8.

Ibid. , PP* 9°-100*
5* Heath to Washington 19 Jan.
1777; Jared Sparks , e d . , Correspondence of the Anerjcan
Revolution. (4 vols.; Poston: Little, Brown,' 1853)1 l"i p. 328.
Heath, Memoir0 , pp. 101-5.
Washington to McDougall 20 Feb. 1777; George Washington,
W ritings of George V?ashlugton, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick,
0 9 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931),
VII, p. 180. (Hereafter referred to as Fitzpatrick.)
G. Clinton to Washington 23 Feb. 1777; Clinton, Publ1c
Papers. I, p. 619*
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In March, as the new regiments began to be completed
in their parent states, orders had to be given for them to
concentrate in anticipation of the opening of the campaign.
Washington ordered three of the five New York regiments to
report to the Highlands while the remainder went to Fort
Ticonderoga.^

Eight of the Massachusetts regiments were

ordered to Peekskill, while seven went to Major Genera]
Philip Schuyler at Fort Ticonderoga in anticipation of a
renewed attack from Canada,.

10

Peekskill was quite logical.

Washington1s choice of
At this point he was unsure

of what the British objective for 1777 was and felt that
Peekskill was a central location from which the troops
could be easily shifted to meet any eventuality.

11

Peekskill had also been used as a supply depot, and
this made it the objective of the first British raid of the
year.

As the port of Courtlandt Manor it was liable to

attack from the river as long as it was not heavily gar
risoned.

On 23 March Lieutenant Colonel John Bird with

five hundred men made this raid.
transports,

They sailed in four

escorted by the frigate Brune. the galleys

Crane and Independence which had been captured in 1776,
and a third galley which had been built during the winter.
Bird landed at 1 PM with detachments of the Fifth, Twentythird, Forty-fourth and Sixty-fourth regiments and four
9.
10.
11.

Washington to McDouga.ll 6 Mar. 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII,
p. 2 57.
Washington to Heath 13 Her* 1777; Ibid.. VII, pp. 282-3.
Washington to Schuyler 12 Mar. 1777; Ib id.. VII, p. 273.
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field pieces at L e n t 1s Cove, a mile and a half south of
town.

The Americans, outnumbered, fell back on McDougall*s

orders to secure the passes above the town.

The British

destroyed the stores and captured one cannon which the Ameri
cans lacked the horses to evacuate.

After an uneventful

night Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett arrived with sixty
men from the Third New York.

He was able to surprise the

British advance guard and chase them back into town with a
bayonet charge.

The British took this as an indication of

significant American reinforcements and reembarked.

The

12
town was reoccupied by the Americans on the twenty-fifth.
A blue cloak captured by Willett in this action subsequently
became part of the flag flown at Fort Stanwix during its
1q
successful defense by the Third New York against St. Leger *~ The Americans became wary of storing materiel near the
river and moved their depots inland to Danbury and Ridgefield
in Connecticut.

In late April Howe dispatched Major General

Tryom with a large force of seven regiments and six field
It
guns to destroy these depots.
The British force sailed,
up the Long Island Sound under naval escort to Norwalk,
where they landed unopposed on 25 April.
12.

13*

It.

They marched to

J. Aimon, The Remembrancer; or. Impartial Repository of
Public Svents For the Year 17^7, (Lond on: By the Author,
1778), pp. 135-6.
This account is borne out in McDougall
to Washington 29 Mar. 1777; Fitzpatrick, V t t , p. 328n.
VI111 iam Wi 11 e11, A Narrative of the Military Actions of
Colonel M arinu.s Willett Taken Chie^lv F^on His Own
Manuscri n t . fN.ew York: G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1831 ; New
York: Arno Press, 1968), p. t2.
G. Hutchinson to Germain 30 Apr. 1777; Almon, Remem
brancer 177?, p p • 11 7- Q .
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Danbury and destroyed the stores there on the twenty-sixth,
the small American garrison having removed as much as pos
sible.

On the return to the coast by way of Ridgefield,

the British column was attacked in a running battle remi
niscent of 19 April 1?75*

Brigadier Generals Benedict

Arnold and David Wooster harassed the British all the way
to Norwalk, but wehe unable to destroy them because they
reached the protection of the naval escorts at Cornpo Beach.
A vast quantity of supplies was destroyed,

but the raiders

suffered casualties of twenty-six killed-, 116 wounded, and
twenty-nine missing.

16
v

American.casualties were similar,

and they felt that the raid had destroyed about half of the
stores.

The resulting confusion was particularly felt in

the Highlands where the food reserves were down to three
days.

16

One important result of this raid was to convince

the Americans that the western part of Connecticut was
17
strategically a part of the Highlands defensive area.
The newly-raised Continentals began arriving at
Peekskill in April.

On 3 April Heath started the initial

Massachusetts detachment en route.

18

Also on 3 April

Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons was ordered to
bring the eight Connecticut regiments to Peekskill.
15.
16.

1°
'

Howe to Germain 22 May 1777; Ibid*, pp. 14-9-50.
McDougall to Washington 5 May 1777; Library of Congress,
George Washington Parers. (Presidential Papers Micro
films, 1
or". K heel 41.
17* Doitgl.ass S . Fr eeman, George Washington. Vol. 4 Leader
of the Bevc1u11o n , (New Y o r k : Seribners, 1951),' p . 5 T l .
18. Heath, Memoi r s , p. 108.
1 9 . Washington to Parsons 3 Apr, 177?; Fitzpatrick, VII,
PP. 35^— 5.
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The first of the Correcticut trooos began moving or 8 April.

20

Also ordered to the Highlands was the newly formed Second
Continental Artillery under Colonel John Lamb and Samuel B.
W e b b ’s "Additional Continental Regiment", both recruited
mainly in Connecticut.

The Second, Fourth, and Fifth Mew

York Regiments were ordered to concentrate in the Highlands
21
on 17 April.
By the end of April there were eight
Massachusetts, nine Connecticut,

two Rhode Island, and

three New York regiments in the Highlands organized in two
22
divisions and two independent brigades. '

The major problem

these troops had on their arrival was smallpox innoculation.
Appreciation of the importance of the Highlands was
frequently expressed as spring approached.

On 23 March the

chain was finally put in place at Popolopen Creek, and. on
25 March the Continental Congress renewed its interest in
the area.

In response to a request from the Mew York Congress

,it was resolved to appoint a Commandant of the Highlands
with the rank of brigadier general.
2B
elected to the job.

George Clinton was

Or 1 April George Clinton wrote to Washington from the
Highlands,

stating that while the garrisons of the forts

were understrength,
20.
21.
22.
23*

they were working on the fortifications

Parsers to Washington 6 Apr. 1777; Charles S. Hall,
Ijife and Let tar s of Sorrel Holder Parsers ("Binghamton,
N. Y . : Otseningo Publishing Company, 1905), p. °2.
Washington to McDougall 1? Apr. 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII,
pp. ^2k~5.
Return of the Army for April 1777; Washi. n gt or Parers.
Ser. 4-, reel 4*1.
Natl or aI 1r oh 1 ve s , Papers cf the Co n t i n e n t a l Cor gr e ss
1 774'—178c, T r*cnscript Joim^nlf*, r*eo 1 \ 6~.
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on the landward side to make them more secure.

He also

enunciated a distinct fear that the British were anticipating
operations up the Hudson,

24

Washington was also conscious

of this possibility, and on 10 April he cautioned McDougall
to be a l e r t , ^

McDougall in turn advised George Clinton

that the British could dispatch a force of nine hundred men
from Staten Island up the Hudson at a m o m e n t a n o t i c e . ^
George Clinton at this time was very concerned over the
weakness of the landward defenses of Fort Montgomery, and
relied heavily on a rapid turn-out of militia to protect the
27
forts in the event that a British attack should develop.
The Danbury raid produced strategic ripples in the
Highlands,

Washington1s intelligence first indicated that

this expedition was to be directed against the Highlands
23
and he accordingly warned McDougall.
The presence of a body
of British shipping at Dobbs Ferry effectively immobilised
the majority of the troops in the Highlands, preventing them
from attacking Tryon's r a i d e r s . ^

In response to this

threat two regiments of Ulster County militia were called
to Fort M o n t g o m e r y . A n average total of several hundred
24,
25.
27.
29.
30.

George Clinton to Washington 1 Apr. 1777; Clinton,
Public Papers. I, pp. 691-3.
Washington toMcDougall 10 Apr. 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII,
p. 387.
26.
McDougall to George Clinton
21 Apr. 1777; Clinton, Public Papers. I, pp. 724-5.
George Clinton to New York Congress 2.6 Apr, 1777, Ibid. f
I, p. 736.
28.
Washington to McDougall 23
Apr, 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII, p. 455 .
McDougall to George Clinton 27 Apr. 1777; Clinton,
Public Papers. I, p. 742.
George Clinton to Colonel Pawling and Colonel
Snyder
2? Apr. 1777; Ibid,. I, pp. ?44-5.
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m en spent four months at the fort .^1
Washington remained with the bulk of the Continental
A r m y in the strong Middlebrook, New Jersey, position as the
spring turned into summer.

British inactivity obscured any

intelligible guess about their objective, either Philadel
phia or Albany.

Therefore, he took up a position which

w o u l d allow him the greatest flexibility to meet either
thrust.

He counted heavily on Fort TIconderoga and the forts

o n the Delaware River to guard the extreme flanks of his
strategic position and delay any British offensive until
the army could concentrate at the danger point.

His force

a t Middlebrook would be well-protected and at the same time
protect most of New Jersey,

The concentration of New York

a n d H e w England troops In the Highlands served the same
32
function for that area.
Washington became deeply concerned with the force in
th e Highlands and the forts because they played such a vital
role in his plans.

He wrote to McDougall that

The imperfect state of the Fortifications of Fort
Montgomery, gives me great uneasiness; because I
think, from a Concurrence of Circumstances, it
begins to look as if the Enemy intend to turn their
Viex?s towards the North CHudson3 River, instead of
the Delaware I therefore desire that Genl. Geo:
Clinton and yourself will fall upon every Measure
to put the Fortifications in such a State, that they
may at least resist a sudden Attack, and keep the
Enemy employed until reinforcements may arrive.33
Colonel Hasbrouck*s Statement of 18
II, p. 469.
32. James T. FIexner, George Washington
Revolution. (Boston: Little, 19 6 7),
33 . Washington to McDougall 7 May 1777;
p. 26 .
31.

June 1778; Ibid.f
in the American
pI 2047"
Fitzpatrick, VIII,

A second letter especially warned him to protect his landward
approaches.

Parsons was instructed to keep his regiments

concentrated rather than spreading them thin trying to protect
3
too much. y

Arnold, generally considered the finest combat

general in the army, was ordered to take command at Peekskill,
but was recalled before he could report, due to his promotion.
Major General Israel Putnam was sent in his place.

36

This

decision would have disastrous repercussions in October.
To inform himself of the exact status of the Highlands,
Washington dispatched Major General Nathaniel Greene, his
right-hand man, -Brigadier General Henry Knox, Chief of the
Continental Artillery, and Brigadier General Anthony Wayne
on 12 May to inspect the area.

They were especially

cautioned to Investigate the possibility of an attack on
37
the forts from the landward side."'

Their report was a

hard, realistic look at the situation, and was summarized
succinctly.

"We beg leave to observe that the object is

too important to be trusted to its present security.”

Their

principle suggestion, to which McDougall and George Clinton
adhered, required that a body of four to five thousand men
be stationed permanently in considerably strengthened forti
fications.
movement.

This would allow the field army total freedom of
Minor points included placing a boom and several

*7*
^
cables in frorj; of the chain to eliminate any possibility
"jof it being snapped by a ship attempting to ram it, and
f

stationing the two Continental frigates and two row-galleys
at the chain to add to the defensive firepower.

This last

point they had taken upon themselves to enact, ordering
Captain John Grenrell of the Constitution to bring his
squadron there as soon as possible.

Their conclusion was

that if the river defenses could be made strong enough the
forts would not be attacked, as "the passes through the
OO
Highlands are so exceedingly difficult."D
Washington

'acted swiftly on this report.On 2k May he

reported to the

Congress that he had ordered Major General

•r?-

Putnam to spdre no effort to finish the forts and emplace a
qq
boom, cables being impractical. ' He T*/as to adopt the
suggested strategy in 1?78 and never deviate from it.

But

this report did cause him to believe that by leaving Putnam
with four thousand men, including militia,
be safe.

the posts would

Four thousard Continentals might very well have

been inadequate
McDougall

to offset Putnam.
filed a follow-up. report on 19 May.

.
In this

report he .seated that if the troops would not defend the
naturally strong passes, they would not defend works.

Never-

the less he -vTas erecting earthworks to cover the defiles as
Washington requested.
38.

He had ordered work on the extensive

Greene ajb al. to Washington 17 May 1777; Washington
Papers. Ser. Jj-, reel kt m
351.- gl^Shingtor to Congress 2k May 1777; Fitzpatrick, V I I I ,

gV '*-P4?-%jU?-h
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river batteries at Port Montgomery to be temporarily suspended
while redoubts were constructed to protect the landward
approaches of Ports Clinton and Montgomery*

Fort Constitu

tion was useless in h i s opinion once Port Montgomery was
passed,

but he ha d also ordered steps to be taken there to

protect its rear.

He also believed that a landward assault

was out of the question and was more concerned with obtaining
the ships to prevent a sudden attack from the river.

As far

as the state of the troops went, he reported that the Massachusetts regiments were sickly and 0almost naked."

40

W ashington responded to this report by stressing that
he was unfamiliar with the area and would defer to the
opinions of McDougall and George Clinton.

He authorized

McDougall to man the frigates and galleys from the army
until seamen could be procured.

But above all he empha

sised that the Continentals should be concentrated and not

dispersed to cover Connecticut.
Ilo
on 1 June 1777.

4l

Putnam assumed command

The Highlands troops were also used offensively in the
summer of 1777.

A detachment of P a r s o n 1s brigade of Connec-

ticut troops raided Sag Harbor, Long Island on 23 May.

^

Washington also hoped to stage a raid on Kings Bridge by

40®
41.
42.

43 .

McDougall to Washington 19 May 1777; Washington Papers,
S er 4 reel 41
Washington to McDougall 20 May 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII,
P. 95*
Israel Putnam, General Orders Issued by Major-General
Israel Putnam When In Com :and of the Highlands, In the
Summer and Pall of-£222, ed. by Worthington C. Ford,
'(Brooklyn, ri.X.: Historical Printing Club, 1893) » P. 6.
A full account is found in Parsons to Washington 25 May
1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII, p. 139n.
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having the troops at Peekskill embark supposedly as a rein
forcement for the forts and then suddenly drop down the
44
river.
While nothing ever happened as a result of this
plan, Putnam continually worked on the idea of raiding the
British outposts.
On 12 June 1777 Washington called a Council of War to
discuss possible plans for the coming campaign.

While the

exact British objective still was not clear, Washington
requested opinions on the size of the Continental garrison
which should be left in the Highlands.

It was agreed that

a total of one thousand effective (enlisted men fit for
duty), together with convalescents and militia would be
f<sufficient to defend the Posts there under the present
appearances of affairs. **

An additional force of approxi

mately one regiment should be left at Morristown for com46
munications purposes. ^ Washington accordingly ordered
Putnam to send all his Continentals in excess of one thou46
sand to the main army*
At this point Howe advanced into New Jersey, maneuver
ing there until the end of the month in an effort to lure
the Americans into an open battle.

It was here that

Washington revealed his maturity as a commanding officer.
His refusal to be tempted away from the strong position at
Middlebrook, or to be frightened into marching to defend the
44.
45*
46.

Washington to Putnam 25 May 1777; Ibid., V I I I , pp. 121-2.
"Varick Transcripts of Minutes of Continental Councils
of War," Washin r.ton Papers f Ser. JFf reel 25.
Washington to Putnam 12 June 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII,
p. 294.
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Delaware River as he had do?ie in 1?76 completely frustrated
Howe.

4?

The British withdrew and began embarking on 1 July.

This was completed or 9 July but Howe did not board ship
until the seventeenth, when the fleet stood down to the
Narrows,

Finally,

on 22 July,

the fleet set sail for

Fh i1 ad e 1 ph ia .
This lethargy on the part of Howe completely confused
the Americans.

An effort to determine troop dispositions and

composition of units of the Continental Army from mid-June
to mid-August becomes an almost impossible task.

Units were

shifted on an almost daily basis, and frequently spent weeks
moving back and forth between New Jersey and the Highlands
4a
as estimates of the British objective changed,.
The effect
on the morale of the troops was summarized best by Brigadier
General John Glover, who said,
uation of our Army,

that we cannot tell this day, where we

60
shall be the next."^
47*
48 •

50.

American estimates of the situation

Flexrer, George W a rh 1.n mton. p. 206,
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1930), pp. 33-4.
For further reference:
Fitzpatrick, VTTX and TX is the
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the Washington Papers in book format*
Putnam, General
Orders. gives ■oertiuent data on the Highlands organiza
tion.
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regimental commanders gives the view of the individual
uni t.
Glover to Azor Orne 22 June 1777; "Transcripts of the
letters and Orderly Books of John Glover 1776-1781,"
(typescripts in New York City Public Library of the
originals at the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.)
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varied immensely.

At one moment they were convinced that

Howe had sailed for Philadelphia, at the next that he was
only executing a deep feint prior to a s c e n d i n g the Hudson to
link up with Burgoyne.
Throughout this period Washington repeatedly stressed
in his letters to Putnam the importance of holding the
Highlands,

Over and over again he emphasized that Putnam

must keep his forces concentrated in the Highlands, and
forsake trying to protect Westchester Country and the Connecticut shoreline.

Although Putnam never gave up the possi

bility of raiding British outposts, and never concentrated
as ordered, he did keep his men alert.

Five musters a day

were standard procedure, and the troops were forbidden to
r'2
get beyond recall distance from their encampments. "
To further complicate matters, Burgoyne1s expedition
started scoring impressive successes, requiring additional
regiments to be sent to Schuyler's army,
advance elements had left Canada.

On 13 June the

Fort Ticonderoga,

the

supposed 8Oilbralter of America* proved to be a paper tiger
and was hastily evacuated on 5 July,

The retreating Ameri

cans were further demoralized by defeats of their rear guard
elements on 7 July at Hubbardton and Fort Anne on 8 July.
Putnam was ordered to dispatch Brigadier General John Nixon's
Massachusetts brigade on 5 July and John Glover1s Massachusetts
brigade on 28 July.
51.

^

For examole: Washington to Putnam 2 5 June, 30 June,
13 July 1777; Fitzpatrick, VTII, pp. 300, 321, 393-^•
52. Putnam, General Orders, p. 18,
53. Glover to Orne 8 July 1777; "Glover Transcripts. *’ Glover
to Timothy Pickering 28 July 1777; Ihid.
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The Highlands were further reduced during July by
transfers of troops to Washington's army.

In Washington's

defense it must be admitted that he fully expected Putnam to
make up these losses by calling out the militia, for Washing
ton realized that HIf vie can keep genl Howe below the HighZIl

lands, I think their Schemes will be entirely baffled.11>

On 24 July Stirling's division and Major General John Sul
livan's division were withdrawn from supporting positions in
New Jersey along with all artillery in excess of the standard
two guns per brigade, and Lamb's Second Continental Artillery
Regiment, a weak one, which was part of the garrison of the
forts,On

yi July a further two brigades,

those of McDou

gall and Jedediah Huntington, were ordered south to join the
field army.

These had been Putnam's s t r o n g e s t . T h e

last

day of July was the day when Washington finally committed
himself to the belief that Howe's objective was Philadelphia,
On that day the field army was ordered to cross the Delaware
and head for that city "with all possible dispatch.11" ‘
The situation in the Highlands at the end of Ju1y was
somewhat ambiguous.

The ships had taken up anchorage at
68
Popolopen Creek in the latter half of June.
The frigates
54.
56.

57*
58.

Washington to Schuyler 2 July 1777; Fitzpatrick, VTII,
pp. 781~S.
65. Washington to Putnam 24 July
1777; Tbld., VTII, r. 460.
Washington to Putnam 31 July 1777; Ibid., VIII, p. 503.
Jedediah to Jabez Huntington 28 July 1777 ; ’’Huntington
Papers: Correspondence of the Brothers Joshua and
Jedediah Huntington During the Period of the American
Revolution 1771-1787," Connecticut Historical Society
Collections, XX (1923), pp. 755-6.
W a eh 1n ,gt.or Parers. S e n . 3C-, reel 26.
G-. Clinton to Putnam 15 June 1777; Clinton, Public
Parers. II, p. 34.
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W 0r*0 tjndormanno d and poor 1.y armed, with only the Cor
having c a m or , nine pouv-d er s taker from Fort Cor s hi tu t ^c r .
The two gal lies, the Shank and the Compd or T wepe also there.

6Q

The cables from the frigates had been stretched in front of
60
the chair."
Washington,■although he had drawn off a large number
of Putnam's Continentals, felt that the posts were not en
dangered as long as Putnam kept enough militia, on duty to
61
prevent the forts from becoming a tempting target.
However,

on the thirty-first of July the militia went home,

dangerously weakening the Highlands.

This left only Lamb's

artillery regiment, Colonel Lewis Dubois' Fifth New York,
and a few small detachments as garrisons of the f o r t s . ^
Putnam retained only cue brigade of Continentals as a field
force.

This was Parsons' brigade, composed of Colonel

Henry Sherburne1s and Colonel Samuel B. Webb's 11Additional
Continental Regiments, " Colonel. Charles Webb's Second Connec
ts cut, Colonel Return Jonathan Meigs' Sixth Connecticut, and
63
Colonel Samuel W yll ys' Third Connecticut regiments."J Parsons
attempted to warn. Washington that troop strength in the
Highlands had fallen to a dangerous level,

as did George

Clinton, who also stated that he had been elected Governor
59.
60.
62.
63.

G. Clinton to Putnam 4 July 1777; Ibid.T II, p. 75;
Putnam General Orders
r* 5k,
G, Clinton, to Washington 11 July 1777; Clinton, Public
Parens, IT, p. 107.
61.
Washington, to G. Clinton
25" July 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII, p. 4 7 3 .
G, Clinton to Putnam 26 July 1777; Clinton, Pub!ic
Papers? I I , pp. 1 39-40.
Hall, Parsonsy p. 106.

f/}.
of Now York and had to spent part of hi s t1 ire at the ear!tol
fh
at Kingston, "
Putnam, however, remained optimistic, al
though he did. request reirforcprents if Washington could
spare them.

This was necessary, he felt, because he had to

maintain a five hundred man force under Parsons at White
Plains.^
By the end of July the war seemed to have left the
New'York City-Highlands area.

Howe had departed for Phila

delphia leaving small defensive garrisons at New York City
and Rhode Island.

Washington had followed him with the

bulk of the Continental troops.

Burgoyne was advancing

relentlessly towards Albany with Schuyler opposing him
with the other Continental field array.

Putnam was left

in command of the Highlands facing Sir Henry Clinton at New
York City.

6A.

Parsons to Washington 30 July 1777; ibid., pp. 106-7;
G. Clinton to Washington 26 July 1777; Clinton,
Public Papers,_ I I , pp. lkO-1.
6 5 . Putnam to Washington 31 July 1777; Sparks, C o m e s pon
ders e . I , op. Al?-8.

CHAPTER VI
SIR HENRY CLINTON ATTACKS THE HIGHLANDS
Sir Henry Clinton arrived at New York City on 5 July
as Howe was preparing to sail for Philadelphia.
was properly horrified.

Sir Henry

In a series of meetings on the

sixth, eighth and thirteenth, he argued that a move to
Pennsylvania, especially by sea, was a waste of the campaign.
He vigorously insisted that the army must advance against
the Highlands to retain the initiative.

By going to Penn

sylvania Howe would allow Washington three alternatives.
Sir Henry saw the most distinct possibility as an American
move to " 1murder u s 1R in Hew York City.

Another large

possibility was that Washington could go north and make
things very hot for Burgoyne.

A final option that Washington

had was to march south to block Howe.

While Clinton by no

means foresaw a calamity, he did fear a setback which would
prevent the campaign from being as decisive as Whitehall
wished.1
This controversy also split the other members of Howe*s
staff.

Major Generals Charles Gray and Sir William Erskin©

supported Clinton, while Major General the Earl Cornwallis,
1.

William B. Willcox, "Too Many Cooks:
British Planning
Before Saratoga,H Journal of British Studies. I I , (Novem
ber, 19^2), pp. 69-70.
This is based on an interpreta
tion of Clinton1s notes at the Clements Library.
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whom Clinton was later to call the evil genius behind Howe's
2
decision, favored the Pennsylvania campaign.
When the
fleet finally departed Sir Henry was left in command of New
York City and its dependencies,
perimeter of outposts.

that is, a one-hundred mile

He was given a force of 7,6^1 rank

and file, which Howe felt was sufficient.*^
almost one half were loyalists.

Of these troops,

The ten battalions of

loyalists were considered by the British to be of value
primarily as forragers and garrison troops.

There was also

a brigade of German mercenaries under Brigadier General
Schmidt, composed of seven regiments.

The key striking force

of the New York garrison troops was composed of detachments
of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, three companies of the
Fourth Battalion of the Royal Artillery Regiment, and seven
h,
infantry regiments of British regulars*
Major General
Robert Pigot was left in Rhode Island with three British
regiments, four German regiments, and a detachment of Royal
Artillery, approximately three thousand men.^

2

.

5.

William B. Willcox, Portrait of a. General:
Sir Henry
Clinton in the War of Independence, (New York:
Alfred
Knopf, vfbk), p. 163.
3 * Howe to Germain 7 July
1777; Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the
Manuscripts of Mrs, Stopford-Sackviile of Drayton House,
NorthampshireT (]T~vols.V London: His Majesty 1s Station
ery Office, 1910), II, pp. ?i-2.
These regiments were the 7th, 26th, 35th, 33,th, **5th,
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John Andrd, Maj or Andr& 1s Journal:
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Sir Viill lam Howe ana Sir Henry Clinton June. 1777 to
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While Sir Henry was not seriously worried about the
possible capture of New York City, he was very conscious
of the vulnerability of his outposts, especially Staten
Island and Long Island.

This prompted him to constantly

reshuffle his forces to meet real and imagined threats
against various sectors of his perimeter.

He was particu

larly afraid that Washington would choose not to follow
Howe and concentrate against New York City.

He was greatly

relieved to discover on 30 July that Washington was leaving
New Jersey for Pennsylvania.
Washington had made his decision to march to defend
Philadelphia on the appearance of the British fleet off the
mouth of the Delaware River.

When the Howe brothers de

cided that it was an inopportune site and sailed for
Chesapeake Bay on 1 August, Washington began to have second
thoughts.

He assumed that the maneuver had been merely a

deep feint to draw him from the Highlands, and that the
fleet was returning to New York.

He therefore halted his

army and disx^atched the rear elements, Stirling's and Sul
livan's divisions, to Putnam's aid, along with McDougall*s
and Huntington's brigades which were en route to join the
7
field a r m y .1 He warned Putnam to be vigilant as
6.

Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. by
William B. Willcox, INew Haven:
Yale University Press,
195**) * pp. 66-70*
7. A series of orders from
Washington on 1 Aug. 1777; George Washington, Writings
of G e orge Washington, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick^ (39
v o l s ^ ; Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1931)>
IX, pp. 3-7.
(Hereafter cited as Fitzpatrick)•
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The importance of preventing Mr. H o w e ’s getting
possession of the Highlands by a coup de, main,
is infinite to America, and in the present
Situation of things, every effort that can be
thought of must be used.8
This uncertain situation persisted for most of August.
By the twenty-first Washington had begun to consider the
possibility that the British were going to attack Charleston,
Q
South Carolina.7 All uncertainty evaporated the next day when
the British were seen in the Chesapeake.

The army was

informed at 10 PM on 21 August that it would march at
AM
10
for Philadelphia*
The troops sent to support the Highlands
were recalled on 22 August with one exception.

11

This was

McDougall’s brigade which was detached to cover New Jersey
on 10 September, and ordered to Pennsylvania on the nine
teenth to replace Washington's losses in the Battle of
12
Brandywine (11 September).
August was a troubled month for Putnam.

As one soldier

wrote on 9 August
We are not without Expectations of an attack....
It is a matter of doubt with me whether they
will attack us among the hills here CPeekskillj
unless they carry that Portress LFort Montgomeryj
.«
•••• The fort is strong if that is any consequence. ^
8*
9*
10.
11.

Washington to Putnam 1 Aug. 1777; Ibid., IX, p. 1.
Washington to Congress 21 Aug. 1777; Ibid.» IX, pp. 107-8.
"Varick Manuscripts of General Orders,“ Library of
Congress, George Washington Papers. (Presidential Papers
Microfilms, 19 61), S e r • 3G~, reel 26.
Washington to Sullivan 22 Aug. 1777; Fitzpatrick, IX,
pp. 115-6.
12. Washington to Putnam 10
Sep. 1777, to McDougall 19 Sep. 1777; Ibid.. IX,
pp. 218-9, 239*
13* David to Brown 9 Aug. 1777;
Ebenezer David, A Rhode Island Chaplin in the -Revolution:
Letters of Ebenezer David to Nicholas Brown 1775-1778.. ed.
by Jearme11e~~black and William KoeIker (Pr ov idenee:'
Rhode Island Society of the Cincinnati, 19^9), PP. 38-9.
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Twenty-five hundred militia were called out to meet the
anticipated emergency, and twelve hundred reported speedily,
hut dissipated just as fast when the British failed to
materialize.

Even in the face of this danger Putnam

ordered Parsons to send five hundred men to Connecticut to
attempt a raid on Long Island.

Colonel Samuel B. Webb's

attack on 22 Agust failed because the loyalist detachment
was forewarned.

1 *5

Parsons* brigade remained at White Plains
16
until the middle of September.
In September another call
for twenty-five hundred militia to man the forts was sent
out.

The response to this alarm was even more transitory

than August*s.

Only three to five hundred men turned out,
17

and dissipated after less than a vreek. f

This error in

dispersing the Continental troops and calling out the militia
on false alarms was to have fatal consequences in October.
Burgoyne*s advance from Canada began to run into
difficulty in late summer.

St. L e g e r 1s advance down the

Mohawk Valley met determined resistance from the Third New
York at Port Stanwix.

The bloody Battle of Orinskany weakened

St. Leger considerably, and rumors of an. American relief
expedition forced him to retreat to Canada on 23 August.
While Burgoyne wrote Sir Henry Clinton on

6

August con

fidently predicting that he would reach Albany on the
1*K

16.

Hugh Jameson, "The Organization of the Militia of the
Middle States During the War fbr Independence 1775-1781,”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
1936), Appendix B.
15. Charles S. Hall, Life
and Letters of Samuel Holden Parsons (Binghamton, N .Y .:
Otseningo Publishing C o ., 1905), P P * 108-9.
Ibid., p. 113*
17. Jameson, “Militia of the
Middle States,? Appendix B.
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twenty-third, his force suffered some reverses.

18

A major

forraging expedition was decimated at Bennington on 16
August, and he was forced to regroup his army.-

He started

his final push on Albany on 11 September, but paused at
Major General Philip Schuyler's estate three days later to
harvest grain.

The first hint of disaster came when his

advance was stopped cold at the First Battle of Freeman's
Farm on the nineteenth*
During the spring and summer the British had used the
valley of the Hudson as a route through which to send
messengers between New York City and Burgoyne• These men
IQ
were frequently caught and hung as spies. 7 Colonel Samuel
B. Webb's “Additional Continental Regiment" was particularly
effective at intercepting messengers, having been outfitted
on 28 June with captured British uniforms.

Because so many

loyalists mistook them for British troops they were known
20
as the “Decoy" Regiment.
On 21 July Howe had directed his
chief of intelligence to hire an American prisoner of war
to carry (unknowingly) a false dispatch to Burgoyne in the
hopes that Washington would capture it and conclude that
the British were going to attack Boston.
18.

21.

As expected,

the

Burgoyne to Clinton 6 Aug. 1777; Clinton, American
Rebellion, p. 70.
19* John Bakeless, Turncoats,
Traitors and Heroes, (Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1959/,
p.’ I W ,
20. Samuel Blachley Webb,
Correspondence and Journals of Samuel Blachley W e b b ,
ed. by Worthington C. Ford~ C 3 v o l s . ; New York:
Wickersham Press, 1893-^), II, p. 5*
Willcox, "Too Many Cooks," p. 75*
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messenger, a "Mr. Williams," gave himself up.

The ruse was

seen through immediately, and Williams revealed the descrip
tions of several other couriers, including one "Taylor" who
22
was to carry a vital message later.
A more successful spy venture was made during August
when an agent spent a week examining the Highlands and
21
reported to Clinton. J The information this agent brought
back, together with Colonel Beverly Robinson's knowledge of
the area, provided Clinton with valuable information which
ojx
he would subsequently use against the Highlands.
Sir Henry had not conducted a static defense even with
his manpower shortage.

Prom 12 to 16 September he conducted

a forraging expedition into New Jersey.

A secondary objec

tive4 of this raid was to try and destroy McDougall8s
brigade.

In this he was unsuccessful, but following the

British withdrawal McDougall marched south to join Washington.
Clinton now began to realize how dangerously weak and out of
position Putnam *s force was.^^

On 11 September he wrote to

Burgoyne that if Burgoyne wished it, Clinton would stage
a diversion against the Highlands with two thousand men as
soon as expected reinforcements arrived from Europe.
22.

23«
24.
25.
26.

26

Glover to James Warren 25 July 177?; "Transcripts of the
letters and Orderly Books of John Glover 1776-1781,"
(Typescripts in New York City Public Library of originals
at the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.).
Bakeless, Turncoats. p. 163 .
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Clinton5to Burgoyne 11 Sep. 1777; Clinton, American
Rebellion, p. 70.
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Clinton by no means considered joining Burgoyne,
he anticiapted doing was dismantling the forts.

The best
As far as

he knew Burgoyne was still planning on wintering at Albany
and Howe still planned to return to New York,

Having dis

mantled the forts, Clinton expected to persuade Howe to
link up with Burgoyne in the 1778 campaign,

27

1 This message

reached Burgoyne on 21 September, after First Freeman's
Farm.28
Parsons began warning Putnam that a British move was
imminent.

On 20 September he reported that he had obtained

intelligence that British reinforcements were expected
daily, and that Sir Henry was planning to attack the High
lands ,^

Parsons repeated the warning on 26 September, and

in a postscript of the twenty-seventh reported that two
days earlier three thousand reinforcements had arrived at
OQ
New York,
On 23 September Washington wrote Putnam repor
ting that McDougall had only 911 men and that it was
imperative that the rest of the twenty-five hundred Contin
entals he had requested be sent to him, under Brigadier
General Varnum.

This order was repeated on 28 September.-^1

Putnam sent these men, stripping his force of Con
tinentals to a new low.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

On 27 September he ordered Parsons'

Willcox, Portrait of a General, p. 177,
John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada as
laid Before the House of Commons, (2nd, e d . ; London: J.
Almon, 1780; l^ew York: Arno Press, 1969 ), p, lxxxviii.
Parsons to Putnam 20 Sep. 1777; Hall, Parsons, pp. 113-^.
Parsons to Putnam 26/27 Sep. 1777; Ibid.. p. 115*
Washington to Putnam 23 Sep. 1777, 28 Sep. 1777; Fitz
patrick, IX, pp. 253, 280,
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brigade to return to Peekskill.-^

The militia which

W ashington was counting on failed to materialized,

however,

and by the end of the month only three hund r e d had reported
out of the six regiments summoned.^3

A large convoy from England h a d reached New York on
24 September.

It contained seventeen hundred British and

German reinforcements.

Then on 29 September a messenger

from Burgoyne reached Clinton bearing a message dated
eight days earlier.

In this note Burgoyne replied to

C l i n t o n 1s letter of 11 September by announcing that he was
preparing to sever his communications with Canada and attempt
to reach New York City.

In this context he stated that even

a threat against the forts would be of great help.
Sir H e n r y began his preparations for an assault on
the Highlands.

While Sir Henry was making these preparations,

Burgoyne *s situation became even more precarious.
October his army went on half rations.
Henry had Commodore William Hotham,
naval officer at N e w York,
to embark troops.

On 3

That same day Sir

the senior British

order transports to Spuyten Duyvil

The flatboats which Hotham ordered in

three divisions under the overall command of Captain Pownall
embarked eleven hundred men that afternoon and sailed up
to Tarrytown.

The next morning these men landed at Tarry-

town where they were joined by a second body of troops
32.

34.

Hall, P a r s o n s . p. 115.
33*
Circular letter to Com
manders of Militia Regiments 29 Sep. 1777; George
Clinton, Public Pacers of George C l i n t o n . (10 v o l s . ;
Albany: State of New York, 1899), II, p. 3^9.
Clinton, American R e b e l l i o n , p. 72*

74
which marched overland from Kings Bridge.

Captain Sir

Janes Wallace was placed in command of the escorts.

These

consisted of several men-of-war and a flotilla of armed
galleys.

Wallace was a logical choice,

based on the ex

perience he had gained on the river in 1776.

A third

group of troops embarked at New York City and joined the
others at Tarrytown on the fourth.
d i v i s i o n aboard his flagship,

Hotham joined this

the frigate Preston.

Clinton later explained that adverse tides prevented his
force of three thousand men from moving earlier.
During the evening of the fourth all the troops
reembarked and he a d e d for Kings Ferry.

Wallace's squadron

preceded the transports and, after covering the noon lan
d ing at Verplanck's Point,
Bay.

'

took up a position in Peekskill

The vastly outnumbered Americans did not oppose the

landing and abandoned a cannon when they withdrew.

Sir Henry

fully expected Wallace to effectually prevent Putnam from
transferring any men to the f o r t s . B u t

to insure con

fusion among the Americans he had Colonel James Be Lancey
raid White Plains with sixty of his loyalist Westchester
Lig h t Horse on the f i f t h . ^
Archibald Campbell,
35.

That night a messenger,

Captain

arrived bearing news that Burgoyne was

Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; J . Aimon, The Remem
brancer: or. Impartial Repository of Public Events For
the Year 1 7 7 7 . (London: By the Author, 1778), pp. 431-2.
36 . Clinton, American R e b e l l i o n , p. 72.
37. Hotham to Lord H owe 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer
,1.777f PP. 431-2.
38.
Clinton, American Rebel
lion . p. 73.
39.
R i v i n g t o n 8s (New York
City) Royal American G a z e t t e , 11 Oct. 1777.
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down to five thousand effectives, was cut off, and could only
h o l d ou t until the twentieth.
felt a b l e to reach Albany,

but wanted to know how soon sup

plies c o u l d reach h i m there.
requested*

Burgoyne stated that he still

An answer in triplicate was

This profoundly shocked Sir Henry,

since the

last h e h a d h e a r d from Burgoyne was that all was going
well.

H e also di d not understand how,

i n f o r m a t i o n in his 11 September letter,
exp e c t to be rescued.

on the basis of the
Burgoyne could

Ilf)

A m e r i c a n strength in the Highlands was ridiculously
absent a t this critical

juncture.

Washington was firmly

of the o p i n i o n that if the British advanced from New York
City,

t hey w o uld move to Philadelphia through New Jersey.

B y 1 O c t o b e r he was also convinced that Burgoyne was doomed.

41

H e d i d solicit m i l i t i a from Connecticut to strengthen
Putnam's dangerously small force.

42

The forts themselves

were poorly manned and quite low on food.

Captain Gershorn

M ott of Lamb's Artillery Regiment commanded at Fort Consti
tution with a single company in garrison.

Colonel Lamb

c o m m a n d e d at F o r t Montgomery with Brigadier General James
C l i nton in overall command of Popolopen Creek's fortifications.
Dubois* regiment was split between the two forts there, a
company of Lamb's artillerymen was at each, and there were
several hundred militia available to man the forts.
40.
41.
42.

On

Clinton, American R e b e l l i o n , pp. 73-4.
W a s h i n g t o n to Putnam 1 Oct. 1777; Fitzpatrick, IX,
pp. 289-90.
W a s h i n g t o n to Trumbull 1 Oct. 1777; I b i d . f IX, p.

296.
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the east bank Putnam h ad finally concentrated his forces at
Peekskill.

Parsons'

brigade of twelve hundred Continentals
Lrt
was supported by three hundred militia. J
At daybreak on 6 October,

a Monday,

the British took

advantage of a heavy f og to reembark the majority of their
troops and cross to Stony Point.

Two loyalist regiments,

Bayard's and Panning's, remained at V e r p l a n c k 1s Point as
did the transports after the assault forces had been ferried
across.

The British column was divided into three groups.

Lieutenant Colonel Mungo Campbell led the advance guard
with Colonel Beverly Robinson as his second-in-command.
This force was composed of Campbell's Fifty-second and the
Fifty-seventh regiments of redcoats,
units:

and three loyalist

Robinson's Highlands-raised Loyal Americans, L ieu

tenant Colonel Andreas Emmerich's Chasseurs,
Alexander Grant's New York Volunteers.

and Major

This wing was to

swing through the hills and strike Fort Montgomery from the
rear.

The longer route they had to travel required that they
h-h.
march immediately to secure Dunderberg pass.
Sir Henry personally accompanied Major General John
Vaughan and the main body.

This section was composed of the

expedition's flank companies,
third regiments,
Regiment,

the Twenty-sixth and Sixty-

one company from the Scottish Seventy-first

a troop of dismounted Seventeenth Light Dragoons,

and Captain von W a l d e n f e l s 1 Anspach-Beyreuth Chasseur
company.
^ 3*

They were transported in the second wave, and

Hall, P a r s o n s . p. 117.
Clinton, American R e b e l l i o n , p. 75*

See M a p 2.
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Map 2
The Battle of 6 October 1777

* Based on John Hill, Sketch of Forts Clinton and M ont
gomery Stormed the 6 th October 1777#««•, Map 16^,
Clinton Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan,

i ^sBri ti sh
Riverbank

m c

^Anisricsiii
Elevations
'V£Swamps and Tidal Flats
^Ponds
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followed the advance guard through the passes.

Their ob

jective was to attack Fort Clinton and thus cover the d e 
tour of Pampbell.

F rom their supporting position they

c ould cover a retreat if Campbell's force failed to
capture Fort M o n t g o m e r y . ^
The rear guard under Major General William Tryon fol
lowed in the third wave*

They were charged with the r e 

sponsibility of keeping communications open to Kings Ferry.
To secure this end the Seventh Regiment remained at Dunderberg Pass while Tryon brought the Hesse-Cassel Musketeer
Regiment von Trumbach under Colonel E. von Bishoffhausen
u p later in the day to support the main body.

46

Campbell's force waited for Vaughan's at the pass on
the west side of the Bunderberg,

and the two continued to

march together until they reached Bear Mountain.

At tills

point Campbell veered west to cross Popolopen Creek and get
into position to attack Port Montgomery.

The main body

passed east of Bear Mountain and advanced from the south
against Fort Clinton between the river and a large pond,
subsequently n a m e d Hessian Lake.

Hie longer march kept

Campbell from getting into position until late in the day.
While the British were moving smoothly ahead,
Americans were in a state of total confusion.

47

1

the

Governor

George Clinton had arrived at the forts to assume command
45.
4?.

Ib i d . , p. 75•
46.
I b i d .. p. 75.
I b i d . , p. ? 6 . Also John Hill *s map of the attack in
British Headquarters M a p s , Clements Library, Ann Arbor,
Mich.
(Photostats of originals at the New York H i s 
torical Society, New York, N.Y.)

on the evening of 5 October and immediately dispatched
Major Samuel Logan with a small scouting party to Kings
Perry,

Logan returned with a report that the British were

advancing early in the morning on the sixth.

48

Putnam

remained completely unaware of the British transfer.

His

scouts reported that a large force was burning the store
houses at Kings Ferry,

and that the British shipping

seemed to be preparing to attack Fort Independence and
Peekskill.

While he wa nted to attack the British, he felt

it would be unwise with the small force available to him.
So he left his force in the passes and together with Parsons
rode down to reconnoitre V e r p l a n c k 1s Point.

By the time

they returned the attack on the forts was already in progres
iic
and it was impossible for him to influence the outcome. 7
Governor Clinton began taking vigorous steps to defend
the forts.

H e dispatched a messenger to Putnam for r e i n 

forcements,

but the

infamous scoundrel” did not report to

*>Q
Putnam until late in the afternoon when it was too late."
A

small force under Lieutenant Paton Jackson was sent to

observe the British advance,

but it ran into the lead e l e 

ments several miles from the forts and retreated.
h e a ring this firing a second,

larger, force was sent out

under Lieutenant Colonel Jacobus Bruyn.
48.
49.
50.

Upon

This column was

George Clinton to Washington 10 Oct. 1777; Clinton,
Public P a o e r s . pp. 389-95*
Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Jared Sparks, e d . ,
Correspondence of the American Revolution (4 v o l s . ;
Boston; Little, Brown, 1853), I, PP* 43*8-40•
Webb, Journals. I, p. 230.

composed of fifty Continentals,
three-pound field gun.

fifty militia, and a

This force took position behind a

stone wall one-half mile south of Port Clinton.

A second

party of similar size was dispatched to cover the approach
to Port Montgomery under the command of Captain Ephraim
Fenno,

also with a field piece.

This force delayed Campbell

until he could deploy flanking parties which drove in the
defenders,
support.

a n d yet another force which had come to their
The gun was captured as was Fenno.

This f i r i n g served as the signal ror V a u ghan to start
his attack.

He cleared Bruyn's troops from their advanced

position an d then h alted on C l i n t o n *s orders to wait for
<2
Campbell to begin his final attack.
In this way pressure
on the defenders could be maximized by coordinated assaults.
The frigates Mercury and Tartar and the British galleys then
advanced upriver and began firing on the forts In support of
the Infantry attack.

The galley Dependence alone fired

ninety-five rounds at the American forts and shipping from
,about 5 FM w h e n the attack began until 5:45 when the troops
became too closely engaged for artillery support. ”
The British assault was more properly a series of
rushes separated by close range exchanges of musketry.
51•
52.
53.

George Clinton to Washington 10 Oct. 1777; Clinton,
Public P a p e r s . II, pp. 389- 95 .
C1 i n t o n .~ Arner 1 can Rebe 111 o n f p. 76 .
Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Aimon, Remembrancer
1 7 7 7 . pp. 4-31-2.
54.
Log of the Dependence in
Franklin D. Roosevelt, e d . , ‘‘Events on H u d s o n 1s River
In 1777, As Recorded by British Officers in Contempor
ary R e p o r t s ,H Dutchess County Historical Society Year
book. XX (1935), P. 96.
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V a u g h a n 9s column attacked the southern face of Fort Clinton,
especially the three gun redoubt forty yards from the main
lines.

Campbell*s men worked on the western point of Fort

Montgomery.

Three times these rushes were hurled back by

the badly outnumbered defenders."

About 5 FM Campbell

approached Fort Montgomery under a flag of truce and
demanded its surrender.

Lieutenant Colonel William S.

Livingston of S. 33. Webb's regiment summarily rejected it.
The final assaults were made about 5:30 FM, at dusk.
Vaughan's force,

on Clinton's orders,

advanced with bayonets

only and in a h ard struggle penetrated Fort Clinton.

The

Trumbach Regiment remained at the stone wall to cover a
retreat if the assault failed.

The attack on Fort Mont

gomery suffered heavier casualties.

Campbell was killed,

and Colonel Beverly Robinson directed the final minutes of
67
the a t t a c k .-"1 Major Grant was also killed, and Captain
George Turnbull assumed command of the New York Volunteers.
Turnbull was the first attacker to enter the works and survive, nine men ha v i n g died in the attempt.
were penetrated,

68

Once the forts

the American resistance crumbled and the

outnumbered survivors took advantage of the darkness to
fight their way from the works.
55.
56.
57.
58.

With this the firing ended.

Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence.
I, pp. 438-40.
G. Clinton to Washington 10 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public
Pa p e r s , II, pp. 389-95.
Clinton, A merican R e b e l l i o n , p. 76.
Rivinrrton *s Royal G a z e t t e T N e w York City), 11 Oct. 1777-

The American squadron failed to make good its escape and
was burned about 10 PM to prevent its c a p t u r e . ^
Any estimate of casualties becomes mired in conflic
ting claims and must be taken with a grain of salt.
official admission of forty killed,

British

l4l wounded, a n d five

missing is probably a bit less than exact.

Losses among

the defenders amounted to under one hundred killed,

but

263 prisoners including twenty-six officers, mostly militia,
were taken.

American estimates varied widely due to the

fact that the confusion of the escape prevented the units
from rallying promptly.

Survivors dribbled in for days.

The Birtish captured sixty-seven guns in these two forts,
an d Fort Constitution which subsequently fell.

They also

captained over six tons of gunpowder and massive quantities
of other stores.

62

All accounts by witnesses on both sides praised the
•gallantry of the combatants.

The badly overmatched Americans

acquitted themselves well, and the British troops achieved
remarkable success in an attack made without the benefit of
close artillery support.

The Americans recognized that 11The

Fort was finally taken, merely for want of men to man the
lines, and not for want of spirit in the men."
59*
60.
61.
62.

63 .

J

Clinton, American R e b e l l i o n , p. 76.
Clinton to Howe-*9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer 1 7 7 7 .
p. 426.
Clinton, American R e b e l l i o n , p. 79*
Clinton to Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer 1 7 7 7 .
pp. 425-6.
Parsons to Trumbull 7 Oct. 1777; Hall, P a r s o n s . p. 118.
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O n 7 October Sir Henry sent a flag of truce to Fort
Constitution demanding its surrender.

However,

"contrary

to the practice of civilized nations,1' Captain,Mott fired
64
on it*
This development resulted in Mott's decision to
evacuate the fort after destroying what he could.

George

Clinton managed to cross the river and confer with Putnam
and Parsons.

It was decided to abandon P eek ski11 and move

what stores they could to the relatively safe F i s h k i l l . ^
Parsons left Immediately to gather militia from Connecticut,
returning on the ninth.

66

Putnam retired to Fishkill with

the bulk of the Continentals while George Clinton returned
to the west bank to rally the remnants of the defenders,
and militia at New Windsor.

He was joined there on the eighth
67
by S. B. Webb's regiment to provide the stiffening needed. '

Far to the north on 7 October, events had occurred which
made further action in

the Highlands futile,Burgoyne

had

been severely defeated

in the Second Battle ofFreeman's

Farm and his surrender was made almost inevitable.
Minor activity occurred on the eighth and ninth.

The

British snapped the chain on 8 October and occupied the
abandoned Fort Constitution.

Upon completing the destruction

there, Wallace sailed up to probe the chevaux at Polopel
Island and returned with news that there were no obstacles
64.
65.
66.
67.

Clinton, American Rebellionf p. 77.
P utnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence.
I, PP. 438-40.
Hall, P a r s o n s . p. 117.
Webb, Journals« I, p. 230.
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to hinder advance once that was passed.

68

On 9 October,

Try o n landed with a force at Peekskill and destroyed the
evacuated buildings at Continental Village.

6q
7 ~

The Americans spent this time rallying their forces.
Putnam reported to Washington on 8 October that he was
convinced that Albany was the British objective and that
while all possible attempts to annoy their passage would

70
be made, he doubted that much could bo d o n e . '

These

sentiments were echoed by Parsons who said the troops would
fight,

but the outcome of any further actions would be in

71
the hands of “the great A r b i t e r . " 1

A note had been sent

to Gates by George Clinton on 7 October advising him of
the fall of the forts.
Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson,

Aide-de-Camp to

Gates, replied on 9 October that Burgoyne was in retreat
and that Gates would send all the militia he could spare

72
to the Highlands.'

This news buoyed American morale.

Sir H e n r y h a d attempted to advise Burgoyne of his
success.
north.

On 6, 8 and 10 October he sent messengers to the
Captain Campbell and Captain Thomas Scott were

7B
both unable to penetrate and returned after several d a y s . '
First Lieutenant Daniel Taylor made the third attempt.

68.
69*
70.
71.
72.
73.

Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer
1222* PP* 431-2 .
Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 78.
Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Sparks, Correspo ndence.
I. PP. 441-2.
Parsons to Trumbull 9 Oct. 1777; Hall, P a r s o n s . p. 119.
Wilkinson to George Clinton 9 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public
Parers, II, p. 384n.
Vaughan to Clinton 19 Oct. 1777; Willcox, Portrait, p. 184.
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Warned by the report of Henry Williams in July, the Americans
were able to snap him up on 14 October.

He carried his

message in a silver bullet which he swallowed when he
realized that he had identified himself to one of S. B. Webb's
patrols rather than one of Burgoyne's.

This movement was

seen and a "severe dose of emetic tartar" was administered
74
which caused him to disgorge it.'
He was courtmartialed,
found guilty, and hung on 18 October.
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Burgoyne remained

unaware of Sir Henry's success until his scouts finally
spotted Vaughan's advance elements on 16 October.

By that

time it was too late to continue r e s i s t a n c e . ^
Sir Henry began to consider the possibilities of ex
ploiting his victory.

However, he was very concerned with

his defensive commitments which prevented his maintaining
all the captured posts.

Therefore, he destroyed Fort

Montgomery and began strengthening Fort Clinton, which he
renamed Fort Vaughan.

Meanwhile, he left the bulk of the

troops under Vaughan at Kings Ferry where they were in a
position to either support Fort Vaughan or return to New
York City.

This latter possibility he considered very

real as he had no information concerning the whereabouts of
Washington.

His hopes were buoyed when he received a

letter from Major General Pigot offering one thousand men
from Rhode Island.
74.

76.

On 11 October Clinton returned to New

James Thacher, A Military Journal During the American
Revolutionary W a r . (2nd e d . ; Boston: Cottons & Bernard,
1827). p. 105.
75* Clinton, Public Papers. II,
p. 444n,
Taylor's confession is in Ibid.. II, pp. 398-9*
Willcox, Portrait, p. 184.
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York City to prepare a renewal of the offensive.

He ordered

Pigot to send the Forty-fifth Regiment and two German
battalions at once to the Highlands.

He also ordered six

months1 provisions for five thousand men put on ships to
77
be taken to Albany. 1
Sir Henry returned upriver on 12 October,
day Burgoyne was effectively surrounded.

the same

Vaughan and Wallace

were sent upriver on ships with orders to help Burgoyne,
78
and if necessary to remain with h i m .f
Vaughan had favored
using a much larger force, but Clinton felt that two
79
thousand men were all that could be spared.'z A series
of ships were left on station throughout the Highlands to
provide communications, and at 5 PM on 12 October the lead
elements of the task force passed the Polopei chevaux-defrise.

On 13 and 14 October the expedition passed upriver
80
slowly, doing moderate damage.
The Americans followed
8l
along both sides of the river.
On 15 October the British flotilla, escorted by the
galleys Dependence. Crane, and Spitfire, brig Diligent, and
Op
tender Hotham. arrived off Kingston.
When they were
stalled there by adverse winds, two small batteries fired on
the flotilla.

Vaughan felt that since he was halted anyway,

and since Kingston was “a nursury for almost every villain
77*
78.
80*

82.

Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 79*
Ibid.. pp. 79-80.
79.
Ibid.. p. 8 On.
Roosevelt, “Events on Hudson*s River," Log of the Depen
dence. p. 98 ; Hotham to Lord Howe 24 Oct. 1777; Ibid.,
p. 115*
81. George Clinton to Committee
of Safety 12 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public Papers. II, p. 423.
Roosevelt, "Events on Hudson *s River," p. 90 .
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in the country,11 he should destroy these batteries.

Troops

were landed and had no trouble scattering the defenders and
capturing the cannon.

When they were sniped at from some

buildings by the militia, Vaughan had the entire town
burned to the ground.
stores were burned.
ships.

In the process a large amount of
Wallace also destroyed several small

The galley Lady Washington escaped destruction by

being run up Roundout Creek and scuttled by her own c r e w . ^
George Clinton's small force could not reach the town in
time to influence the action, and the state government
84
decamped with great haste.
Sir Henry was later to claim
8*5
that the town was burned as a military necessity. ^ S. B.
Webb was probably closer when he said "such cursed Barbarity
is not equalled in History, Revenge for Burgoyne®s misfor*
time seems their darling object."
On 17 October Burgoyne surrendered.

Wallace and Vaughan

continued upriver to Livingston's Manor, forty-five miles
south of Albany, which they reached on 19 October.
they destroyed some shipping and buildings.
refused to go further.

En route

There the pilots

Vaughan began to feel uneasy as the

militia turned out to raise Putnam's force to about five
thousand and George Clinton's to fifteen h u n d r e d . S i r
Henry had meanwhile received an order from Howe to dispatch
83#
85*
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87#

Vaughan to Clinton 17 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer
1777. pp. 427-8.
84. George Clinton to Putnam
15 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public Papers. II, p. 438.
Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 81.
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three British regiments,

two German battalions, and all

detachments from units with the main army, even if he had
oo
moved upriver.
Sir Henry wrote Vaughan to return to New
York City because of this order*
89
were also to be abandoned. 7
23 O c t o b e r . ^

The passes of the Highlands

Vaughan retreated at 8 AM on

Port Clinton, now Port Vaughan, was abandoned

and destroyed on 25 October, and on the twenty-seventh the
91
last British units arrived back at New York City.7
The
Highlands were now completely in American hands again.

88 . These units, the 7th, 26th, and 63rd British Regiments,
the Jaegers, and the 1st and 2nd Anspach battalions,
arrived at Billingsport, Pennsylvania, on 17 November.
An&rd, JournalT p. 6^.
89 . Clinton. American Rebellion, pp. 80-1; H o w e ’s message
is paraphrased in Howe to Germain 21 Oct. 1777; Manu
scripts of Staoford-Sackville. II, pp. 78-9*
90. Webb, J ournals. I, p. 233*
91* Hivlngton1s TNew York City) Royal Gazette. 1 Nov. 1777•

CHAPTER VII
THE SUBSEQ U E N T PATE OF THE HIGHLANDS AND AN
EVALUATION OF THE EVENTS OF 1777
The same day that disaster struck the Highlands,

6

October 1777, the Continental Congress resolved that
W a s h i n g t o n should send one of the army's four engineers
"to do duty at Fort Montgomery + the defences on Hudson's
R i v e r * O n

8 October Washington ordered Lieutenant

Colonel Louis LeBegue DuPortail to report to Putnam at
F o r t Montgomery.

2

This was to prove very important in

the attempt to rebuild the fortress complex in the Highlands.
After the defeat of Burgoyne, a large element of
Gates* army was freed for operations further south.

Twenty

regiments were directly requested by Washington on 29
October,

a n d a further two brigades were ordered from

'i
Putnam's share of the reinforcements on the next day.*'
This left several thousand Continentals still in the
Highlands.

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton,

who

h a d been sent north by Washington to- supervise forwarding

1.
2.

3.

National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress 17741 789. Transcript Journal s . reel 17.
Washington to Hadiere 8 Oct. 1777; George Washington,
W ritings of George Washington, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick,
T39 vols. ; ’
W ashington: Government Printing Office, 1931),
IX, p. 339.
(Hereafter referred to as Fitzpatrick.)
Library of Congress, George Washington Papers. (Presiden
tial Papers Microfilms, 19bll, 3er, 3P, reel 25; W a s h i n g - •
ton to Putnam 30 Oct. 1777; Fitzpatrick, IX, pp. 464~5»
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Gates* troops to Pennsylvania, ran into difficulty with
Putnam*

Hamilton wrote Washington on 2 November that Putnam

intended to retain four thousand Continentals to attack New
4
*
York City*
Washington wrote to Putnam on 4 November
directly ordering him to retain only enough troops to rebuild
the forts and to send the rest immediately to relieve the
weak main army*
fEhe threat from Canada was further alleviated on 8
November when the British garrison at Port Ticonderoga
destroyed that fortress and retreated.

Putnam still pro

crastinated, considering an attack on New York City*

This

scheme was out of the realm of possibility and infuriated
6
Hamilton, who referred to it as Putnam's "hobby-horse.”
George Clinton requested Gates to inspect the Highlands
on h i s way to report to the Continental Congress, and com
plained that Putnam was off in Westchester County leaving
7

only

the wrecked regiments to defend the Highlands.

As

late

as 27 December George Clinton could report that S.

B.

Webb*s regiment had been repulsed in a raid on Long Island,
and that although
Gen'l Putnam is ordered to turn his Views to the
works for the Security of the River in Future.hardly anything is done yet at them
little I
4*
5*
6.

Hamilton to Washington 2 Nov. 1777; Jared Sparks, ed.,
Correspondence of the American Revolution. (4 vols.;
Boston: Little, Brown, 1 6 5 3 7 , 1 1 ppV 24-5•
Washington to Putnam 4 Nov. 1777; Fitzpatrick, X, pp. 2-3.
Hamilton to Washington 10 Nov. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence,
IX, p. 33*
7. George Clinton to Gates 1?
Bee. 1??7; George Clinton, Public Papers of George Clinton,
(10 vols.; Albany: State of New York, 189971 II, pp. 586-9.
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think is to be expected.
The Good M a n C s J
o
Views are not calculated for Things of this Sort.
A penetrating evaluation of Putnam, but unfortunately about
six months too late.

New York City posed no threat, as Sir

Henry Clinton had a mere 6,142 men and felt that he was

q

limited to a static defense.'
The Continental Congress was deeply concerned with the
refortification of the Highlands and passed a series of
resolutions on 5 November to start action.

Washington was

to have Gates replace Putnam in the Highlands, send one or
two more "able engineers" to assist him, and have Gates
supervise the construction of new forts.

Gates was or

dered to collect all the galleys, chains, and other acces
sories he felt necessary to obstruct the river, and was
cautioned not to make the forts "too extensive, " and to
Insure "that each be completed with a well, magazines,
barracks,

bomb casements VsheIters/

for a determined defence."*^

as would be sufficient

Putnam and George Clinton

both preferred West Point to the old Popolopen Creek site.**
Washington deferred to their better knowledge of the .
countryside, and gave them a free hand.

12

On 12 January 1778 the first troops began construe11
tion at West Point. J
8.

10.
11•
13.

Lieutenant Colonel Radiere,

the

George Clinton to Colonel William Maicom 27 Dec. 1777;
Ibid., II, pp. 607-8.
9» Sir Henry Clinton, The
American Rebellion, ed. by William B. Willcox,~TNew
Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 84.
Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 17*
Putnam to Washington ? Nov. 1777; Sparks, Correspon
dence » II, P. 30.
12. Washington to Putnam II
Nov. 1777; Fitzpatrick, X, p. 40.
Hugh Hughes to G. Clinton 12 Jan. 1778; Clinton,
Public Papers. II, p. 672.

92
engineer who replaced DuPortail, dissented and stirred up
yet another argument.

He insisted that the new fortress

would be easily besieged because it was dominated by a
series of hills.
This defect did not exist at Popolopen
Ik
Creek.
Washington reprimanded him, and ordered him to
go along with the majority and get something built before
15
the spring opened the new campaigning season. ^
Progress began with this decision on the site, and
the appointment of George Clinton to supervise the con
struction on 18 February.

In a resolution of that date the

Continental Congress appointed him to replace Gates under
the provisions of the 5 November 177? resolutions.
Governor Clinton!s energy produced results.

16

On 16 March

Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons, whose brigade was
at work at West Point, wrote Washington informing him that
the first guns were being emplaced, and that the main work,
Fort Arnold, would be well advanced by the end of the month.

i7

{

Major General Alexander McDougall, recently promoted, was
ordered to the Highlands on 16 March with orders to exercise
command of the entire Highlands area and its dependencies.

1 ft

He was equally energetic and could report on 13 April that

Ik. Radiere to Washington 13 Jan. 17?8; Elizabeth Kite,
15*
16.
17*
18.

Brigadier-General Louis Lebeque Duportail, (Washington:
Institut Pranpais de Washington, 1933)> P* 86.
Washington to Radiere 25 Jan. 1778: Fitzpatrick, X, p. 3^9*
Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 17*
Parsons to Washington io Har. 1778; Charles S. Hall,
Life and Letters of Samuel Holden Parso n s , (Binghamton,
N.Y. : Otseningo Publishing Company, .1985), PP* 158-7.
Washington to McDougall 16 Mar. 1778; Fitzpatrick, XI,
P. 95.
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the works were sufficiently advanced to preclude falling to
a sudden raid, but that they were still liable to a siege
because several important hills were as yet not defended.1^
A new chain was emplaced that spring,

the necessary

hills were defended, and work continued throughout the war

to improve upon the defenses.

In response to advice from

Washington, the Continental Congress formally created an
20
independent command for the Highlands on 21 March.
This
unified structure proved to be one of the most important
results of the fiasco of 1777.

By March of 1779 Portress

West Point had reached a sufficient level of development
that the Americans desired a British attack on it.

They were

-confident that such an attack would be shattered, and that
21
they could counter-attack and recapture New York City.
As
Surgeon Thacher wrote on 26 September 1778, West Point was
Considered by General Washington as the key which
locks the communications between the eastern and
southern states; and of all the pos£s in the United
States, this Is the most important.
Prom 1??8 to the end of the war in 1783 the greater
Hudson Highlands became the center of the American strategy.

19 .
21.
22.

McDougall to Washington 13 Apr. 1778; Kite. Duportai1 .
pp. 93-^•
20.
Papers of the Continental
Conorress. Transcript Journals, reel 1?.
Louis Du Portail, Hemoire sur la defense de Wespoint,
Translated typescript of the original at the United
States Military Academy Library, ’
W est Point, N.Y.
James Thacher, A Military Journal During the American
Revolutionary WarV" (2nd ed. : Boston:
Cottons & Bernard,
1827T7~PP^ 210-11.
The best source on the subsequent
history of West Point in the war is Dave Richard Palmer,
The River and the Rock:
The History of Portress West
Point. 1775-T?j53f fbew York:
Greenwood Publishing Co.,

19397.

9^
West Point was the fortress which anchored this defensive
position.

Only once was Washington to move the main field

army from close supporting range of West Point, and that was
in l?8l to destroy Cornwallis.

Even then he left half of his

force in the Highlands on constant alert, and took elaborate
precautions to convince Sir Henry Clinton that Hew York City
was his objective.

Only minor skirmishing took place in the

Northern half of American after the battle of Monmouth on 28
June 1778, and this was dictated by Washington's refusal to
abandon the Highlands, and British inability to attack him
there.

The Campaign of 1777 had taught this lesson to

Washington, and it represents the turning point of the war
in terms of strategic thinking.

The importance of Washington's

new strategy, which effectively stalemated the British in
the northern colonies, qualifies this campaign to rank in
importance with Valley Forge and Saratoga as one of the key
factors in the ultimate American victory.
The first immediate repercussion of the Campaign of
1777 had been a series of courts of inquiry into the actions
of the principal commanding officers of the various forts
which were captured in New York and Pennsylvania.

Washing

ton was ordered by the Continental Congress to establish
such a court for the Highlands forts on 28 November 1777*
Washington appointed Major General McDougall, Brigadier
General Jedediah Huntington, and Colonel Edward Wigglesworth as the investigating officers.

Washington wrote to

George Clinton that he fully expected the Clinton brothers,
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Putnam, and Parsons to be exonerated, as he felt it was a
case of simple bad judgement.

He did expect it to be

a good excuse to retire Putnam, whom he felt had outlived
23
his usefulness. ^
Actual responsibility for the loss of the forts must be
placed on Putnam for failing to make realistic defensive
preparations.

He left the forts undermanned, dispersed his

Continentals, and ignored repeated warnings and indications
of a British advance.

This was due to his inherent incapacity

as a general and not, as one contemporary accused him, of
having intimate relations with Beverly Robinson*s wife,
2k
revealing information to her, and being drunk.
All the
other officers on the scene behaved superbly.

Washington

has been accused of misunderstanding the British plans and
drawing off too many Continentals from the Highlands.
is hindsight,

This

While Washington did draw off the Continentals,

he fully expected Putnam to replace them with militia,
which Putnam failed to do. ^

In the light of the optimistic

reports Putnam had been sending, and the other information
he had, this was a reasonable request.

Furthermore,

V/ashington had repeatedly issued instructions for the defense
of the Highlands which, if followed, could have saved the
forts, for he correctly foresaw the danger of an attack
from the landward side.
23*
2km
25*

Washington to George Clinton 12 Mar. 1778; to Robert
Livingston 12 Mar. 1778; to Putnam 16 Mar. 1778;
Fitzpatrick, XI, pp. 6 8 , 6 9 , 9A.
Letter from A VIRGINIA OFFICER, Hew York Packet and
American Advertiser (Fishkill), 10 Dec. 1778.
Washington to George Clinton 15 Oct. 1777; Fitzpatrick,
i x , pp. 372-3 .
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On the British side the most striking point is that
after brilliantly siezing the Highlands,

they abandoned them.

Germain has been correctly blamed for the overall failure of
coordination in the Campaign of 1777.

This defect is not

confined to this one campaign, but rather to the general
attitude he maintained towards planning for the war.

Sir

William Howe claimed that there was no advantage In ascending
the Hudson with his main army, and much to be gained by
P^
attacking Philadelphia.
This was indeed one of the great
est British blunders of the war, exactly because it drew
him away from the basically sound strategy of severing the
colonies.

His successes in Pennsylvania were meaningless.

As Henry Knox observed,

n *Upon the whole, I know he ought

(sic), in justice to his master, to go either up the North
Hiver or the eastward, and endeaver to form a juction
77
with Burgoyne.*n w '

Burgoyne can be dismissed as a blunderer

who, knowing he would have no support, essentially threw
his army away.
Sir Henry Clinton scored the most spectacular success
of his career with a feat unparalleled by any other British
commander in the war.

Admittedly,

it was physically

impossible for him to rescue Burgoyne, and he could not hold
pQ
the Highlands once he had captured them.
But Burgoyne and
26.

28.

Sir William Howe, 11The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir
William Howe, &c.,M in Bellamy Partridge, Sir Billy
H o w e . (New York; Longmans, Green and Co., 1932), pp.
27"6-7•
^7.
Henry Knox to Lucy Knox
26 July 1777; Francis S. Drake, Life and Correspondence
of Henry K n o x f (Boston: By the author, 1873), p. k6 0~
William B. Willcox, “Too Many Cooks:
British Planning
Before Saratoga,” Journal of British Studies. II (Nov.,
1962), pp. 8?-8 .
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Howe must bear the responsibility for his being too late with
too little.

This operation was "prompt, well planned,

successful, and fruitless.

Clinton could score off the
29
Americans, but not off Howe." 7
The one time in the war that the British army was able
to sieze the single most important piece of terrain in the
War of American Independence, they failed to retain it.

The

Americans never gave them a second chance.

29.

William B. Willcox, Portrait of a General:
Sir Henr?f
Clinton in the War of Indepe ndence“ (New York!
Alfred
K n o p f , 196ft;] p. 49^.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OP TECHNICAL TERMS
Abatis - An obstacle serving the function of barbed wire
formed of trees felled toward the enemy.
Aide-de-camp - A staff officer.
Adjutant - A staff officer.
Battalion - The tactical unit in all armies, at this time
virtually synonymous with regiment.
It was usually
composed of eight to then normal, or line, companies
and two special, or flank, companies in British
battalions.
Chevaux-de-frise - Underwater obstacles consisting of a
heavy timber frame bustling with iron-tipped spikes.
Commissary - A staff officer responsible for supply functions*
Coup-de-main - A sudden assault against a fortified position
as opposed to a siege.
Fascines - Bundles of sticks used in military construction.
Flank Companies - Each British battalion had a light
infantry company and a grenadier company which were
elite units frequently detached to form special
battalions for specific campaigns.
Fleche - A small arrow-shaped earthwork open to the rear.
Fraise - A line of stakes imbedded as a horizontal palisade
around a fortification.
Quartermaster - A staff officer responsible for supply
functions.
Quartermaster General - Senior supply officer.
Rank and file - Those enlisted men present in the line of
battle with weapons, exclusive of sergeants and musicians.
Redan « A two-sided earthwork similar to a fleche.
Redoubt. - A relatively small independent outwork, completely
enclosed, frequently used to protect the approaches to
fortresses.
Regiment - In all armies the administrative unit of organi
zation.
Only certain regiments such as the Seventyfirst Regiment had more than one battalion at this time.
Rifle pit - The forerunner of the modern foxhole.
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APPENDIX B
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MILITARY RANKS
Lieutenant General
Major General
Brigadier General
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Captain
Captain-Lieutenant - Virtually synonymous with First
Lieutenant*
*Pirst Lieutenant
^Second Lieutenant - Virtually synonymous with Ensign.
^Ensign
Sergeant
Corporal
Private

*A11 of these ranks were occasionally refered to as Subalterns*
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